Patronage, Reputation and Common Agency Contracting in the Scientific Revolution: From Keeping 'Nature's Secrets' to the Institutionalization of 'Open Science' by Paul A. David
This work is distributed as a Discussion Paper by the 
 






SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 03-39 
 
Patronage, Reputation and Common Agency 
Contracting in the Scientific Revolution: 
From Keeping ‘Nature’s Secrets’ to the  
Institutionalization of ‘Open Science’ 
      
By 
Paul A. David 
Stanford University & 







Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 
Stanford University 











The Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University supports research bearing on 
economic and public policy issues.  The SIEPR Discussion Paper Series reports on research and policy 
analysis conducted by researchers affiliated with the Institute.  Working papers in this series reflect the views 




Patronage, Reputation, and Common Agency Contracting 
 in the Scientific Revolution: 
    




Paul A. David 
Stanford University & the University of Oxford 
 
 
First version: March 2000 
Second draft: May 2004 







This paper has evolved from another, entitled “Reputation and Agency in the Historical Emergence of the 
Institutions of ‘Open Science,” the first draft of which was circulated for comment in May, 1991.  Its 
development has been part of the work towards a book about the economic organization of research in 
science and technology in the West since 1550, provisionally entitled Patronage, Property and the 
Pursuit of Knowledge. That project drew early support from a grant from the Science and Society 
Program of the Mellon Foundation, and later from the Renaissance Trust (UK).  Its initial 
conceptualization was shaped over two decades ago by my concurrent collaborative research with Partha 
Dasgupta on the economics of science. Weston Headley provided extraordinarily able research assistance 
during this project’s early phase. My explorations of what for me was a new historical terrain were 
greatly encouraged and assisted by being able to begin reading extensively in the history and philosophy 
of science during 1990-91, when I held a Stanford Humanities Center Fellowship.  Mario Biagioli, Noel 
Swerdlow, and the late Richard Westfall generously discussed their own archival researches relating to 
this subject; they also instructed me by supplying innumerable bibliographic references, only some small 
fraction of which have found their way into the present version. The original draft from which the present 
work has developed was presented to the Conference on the “Economics of Conventions," organized by 
André Orléans and held under the auspices of the Centre de Recherche en Épistémologie Appliquée 
(École Polytechnique), Paris, March 27-28, 1991. The process of revision also subsequently benefited 
from discussions by participants in the Social Science History Workshop at Stanford University (Winter 
Quarter 1992), the Economic and Social History Seminars at Oxford, and at Cambridge (Spring, 1994), 
and a joint meeting of the Yale Economic History and Industrial Organization Seminars (Fall, 1994). Still 
further improvements were suggested by Joel Mokyr and other participants in the National Academy of 
Sciences Conference on Science, Technology and the Economy, organized by Ariel Pakes and Kenneth 
Sokoloff at the Beckman Center, Irvine, California, 20-22nd October 1995. Also memorable, even at this 
advanced stage in the career of this paper are the trenchant comments and constructive critical advice 
provided by a wonderfully learned and mixed company of economists, economic historians and historians 
of science:  Robert Auman, Robin Briggs, Avner Greif, Scott Mandelbrote, Ian McLean, Trond Olsen, 
Gerald Silverberg, and Noel Swerdlow. Sheila Johansson’s keen editorial eye and ever-ready pen effected 
many improvements throughout this most recent draft. None of those whose help is gratefully recorded 






This essay examines the economics of patronage in the production of knowledge and its 
influence upon the historical formation of key elements in the ethos and organizational 
structure of publicly funded open science. The emergence during the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries of the idea and practice of “open science" was a distinctive and vital 
organizational aspect of the Scientific Revolution. It represented a break from the previously 
dominant ethos of secrecy in the pursuit of Nature’s Secrets, to a new set of norms, 
incentives, and organizational structures that reinforced scientific researchers' commitments 
to rapid disclosure of new knowledge.  The rise of “cooperative rivalries” in the revelation of 
new knowledge, is seen as a functional response to heightened asymmetric information 
problems posed for the Renaissance system of court-patronage of the arts and sciences; pre-
existing informational asymmetries had been exacerbated by the claims of mathematicians 
and the increasing practical reliance upon new mathematical techniques in a variety of 
“contexts of application.” Reputational competition among Europe’s noble patrons motivated 
much of their efforts to attract to their courts the most prestigious natural philosophers, was 
no less crucial in the workings of that system than was the concern among their would-be 
clients to raise their peer-based reputational status.  In late Renaissance Europe, the feudal 
legacy of fragmented political authority had resulted in relations between noble patrons and 
their savant-clients that resembled the situation modern economists describe as "common 
agency contracting in substitutes" -- competition among incompletely informed principals for 
the dedicated services of multiple agents.  These conditions tended to result in more favorable 
contract terms (especially with regard to autonomy and financial support) for the agent-client 
members of the nascent scientific communities. This left the new scientists better positioned 
to retain larger information rents on their specialized knowledge, which in turn tended to 
encourage entry into the emerging disciplines. They also were thereby enabled collectively to 
develop a stronger degree of professional autonomy for their programs of inquiry within 
increasingly specialized and formal scientific academies which, during the latter seventeenth 
century, attracted the patronage of rival absolutist States in Western Europe. 
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Prologue: The situation of ‘open science’ in the modern world – a motivation 
 
Science and technology policy and innovation policy broadly conceived have moved 
into prominence on the economic policy agenda of the European Union, where the Council of 
Ministers (meeting in Lisbon in October 2000) identified raising the R&D investment rate (by 
half again, to the level of 3 percent of GDP) as one key instrument for attaining the goal of 
improving the “international competitiveness” of the region. A second, concurrent strategic 
approach has been to call for more fundamental institutional reforms in public sector research 
and training. The Commission of the European Communities has been seeking to stimulate 
discussion and debate upon institutional and regulatory changes that would redefine the future 
role of the region’s institutions of higher education and its public research organizations in 




A sense of urgency has attended these discussions, which are not only reminiscent of, 
but explicitly reprises discussions and debates about the organization and public funding of 
R&D activities in the United States a decade ago. Similarly, there has been no evident 
hesitation on the part of many science and technology policy-makers in advancing and 
entertaining proposals for potentially far-reaching institutional innovations.  It was not 
entirely coincidental that such issues were broached for serious discussion in the U.S. during 
the late 1990s, against a backdrop of unprecedentedly large contractions in the levels 
projected for real federal expenditures for both defence-related and civilian R&D over 1997-
2002 interval.
2  Lively debates over science policy had erupted in the U.S. on many previous 
occasions. But, the most recent episode would seem to have been the first sustained occasion 
to see the fundamental questioning of many of the infrastructure institutions and 
organizational commitments that framed the nation’s science and technology system since the 
major restructuring initiated by the 1945 report of Vannevar Bush.
3   
 
Even when the U.S. federal funding picture seemed to improve for basic research, 
opinion-leaders in the areas of science and education there, and their counterparts elsewhere 
have continued to ask whether universities should continue to be supported as the primary 
sites for conducting basic research in an “open” fashion which facilitates its close integration 
with graduate teaching. Some have opined that universities’ emphasis on research is seriously 
detrimental to undergraduate teaching. Others wonder whether an ‘academic research’ 
environment is compatible with concurrent efforts to expand the sphere of collaborative R&D 
with industry, pro-active forms of “technology transfer,” and to make more extensive use of 
intellectual property and other means of establishing a proprietary interest in the research 
activities of faculty, staff and students?  Might it not be better to hive off both basic and 
 
1 See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities (COM 2003). Emulation of what is construed to 
be ‘the American model” of closely coupling business and university research has emerged as a significant 
policy theme in EU member countries. See David (2004) for a critical examination of the currently fashionable 
European government proposals to follow the institutional experiment initiated by the Bayh-Dole Act (1980); 
and, in the UK particularly, to encourage universities in “managing” and “exploiting” their intellectual property 
assets (including the potential consultancy services of their faculties) in order to generate revenue support for 
research and teaching.   
2  See Boesman 1997, Koizumi, 1997, and Mowery 1997. 
3 On the Bush Report, the recurring issues in US science policy debates, and the prelude to the recent 
discussions, see, e.g., David 1996, Boesman 1997 and references therein.  2 
 
 
                                                          
applied research into specialized institutes, thereby resolving conflicts that arise between the 
universities’ conduct of their traditional functions and the drive on the part of other 
organizations and agencies (both private and governmental) to control information flows in 
order to better exploit new findings?  Issues similar to those concerning the future role of the 
university in the “national innovation system” also have arisen in discussions of moves 
towards ‘privatizing’ formerly state supported non-military research organizations as the 
National Laboratories in the U.S., and the civilian applied science institutes maintained by 
many governments elsewhere. Following perceptions of the “American model” in this matter, 
the re-orienting national research institutes towards application and commercial exploitation 
of their research output 
4  The wave of  sceptical re-consideration directed toward these long-
standing institutions and familiar organizational practices, has not been unsalutary, because  it 
has been largely informative even when not invariably constructive.
5
 
The same cannot be said, however, regarding the ongoing global drift of institutional 
change towards a stronger, more extensive and globally harmonized system of intellectual 
property protections. In the view of an increasing number of observers, the consequence has 
been the to dangerous disturb the delicate balance between private property rights and the 
public domain in data and information, especially in the sphere affecting scientific and 
educational activities.
6 To state the point concretely and succinctly, the effective functioning 
of the institutions of ‘open science’ are today being increasing placed in jeopardy by the 
patenting of research tools, particularly in the areas of software and the biomedical sciences, 
and by the emergent conjunction of statutory protections for technical systems of “self-help” 
for copyright holders and sui generis legal protection of property rights in databases. 
 
The latter, two-pronged formation threaten the effective “disintegration” of a 
cornerstone of the historical regime of copyright that emerged in the post-Gutenberg epoch, 
and which subsequently came to under-gird the institutionalized practice of open science. A  
foundational precept of the legal regime of copyright has been that whereas ideas, facts and 
their modes of expression “naturally” belong in the public domain, granting to private parties 
temporary possession of exclusive rights to exploit these may serve important, socially 
beneficial purposes. Notable among these has been the protection of the originators of 
expressive material from the economic damage of unfair competition by unauthorized 
copyists, in the same way that inventors are enabled to more fully appropriate the economic 
benefits of their creations by the awarding of patent rights.  In the terminally “out-of-balance” 
intellectual property rights regime towards which we seem to be headed, the operating 
premise is that “information-goods” which can be fixed in digital form are “intellectual 
assets”; accordingly, they should be treated symmetrically with all other forms of private 
 
4 For entry points to the vast literature, see e.g., David, Mowery and Steinmueller (1994) on university-
industry R&D collaborations; Guston and Keniston (1994) on university relations with the federal government; 
Branscomb (1994), Cohen and Noll (1994) on the National Labs. 
5 Of course, all distributions have their extremes. See the effort in David (1996) to rectify one 
particularly flagrant outlier among the criticisms directed at the public funding of science and calls for reforms 
of a sweepingly destructive kind.  
 
6 On the role of the public domain in scientific and technical data and information, particularly in 
relation to exploratory research, see David (2003b); more generally, consult the other contributions to the 
National Academy of Science Symposium publication in which it appears. On patents, see, e.g., Walsh, Arora 
and Cohen (2003), and other chapters in the same source.   3 
 
 
                                                          
property, and therefore should be subject to perpetual private ownership under the protection 
of copyright and copyright-like statutes. Moreover, all technical means of enforcing those 
rights – through the deployment of digital water-marking, encryption and electronic digital 
rights management systems -- should be kept safe by legal restraint of technological means 
that might be used to defeat them.
7  In other words, ‘technological self-help’ for holders of 
intellectual property is to be reinforced by criminal sanctions against the use of ‘technological 
self-help’ by users of data and information-goods.  
 
Whatever the import of these recent legal trends may be for the future of commerce in 
digital music and video information-goods, the focus of the concern motivating this essay is 
that when taken in conjunction with broader pressures for the curtailment of public funding of 
knowledge production and distribution, they are likely to have retrograde effects upon the 
long-run vitality of scientific and technological research and all the societal benefits deriving 
therefrom. The advancement of knowledge is a cumulative process, one that depends on the 
rapid and widespread disclosure of new findings, so that they may be rapidly discarded if 
unreliable, or confirmed and brought into fruitful conjunction with other bodies of reliable 
data and information. “Open science” institutions funded from the public purse provide an 
alternative to the intellectual property approach to dealing with difficult problems that arise in 
the production and distribution of information under competitive market conditions. 
Although not a perfect solution to those problems, and one that requires sustained 
public patronage of research agents who are enjoined to quickly disclose and freely share 
information about their methods and findings, as a mode of generating reliable knowledge, 
“open science” depends upon a distinctive non-market reward system to solve a number of 
resource allocation problems that have their origins in the peculiar characteristics of 
information as an economic good. The collegiate reputational reward system (conventionally 
associated with open science practice in the academy and public research institutes) does 
create conflicts been the ostensible norms of ‘cooperation’ in the full disclosure of methods 
and finding, and the impulses of self-interested actors to engage in non-cooperative 
behaviors. The latter also draw greater encouragement, if such was needed, from the prizes 
that await the victors in races to establish claims to priority of discovery or invention. Despite 
these and still other sources of inefficiency in way the open science regime affects the 
allocation of research resources, it is a mode of organizing and governing the conduct of 
science that can properly be regarded as uniquely well-suited to the goal of maximizing the 
rate of growth of the stock of reliable knowledge. It performs that function both directly 
through fundamental scientific discoveries and the devising of new tools and techniques for 
research, and well as indirectly through a variety of complementary interactions with the 
proprietary private-sector R&D regime that is oriented to produce and market applied 
science-based innovations.
8  
But, the programs of exploratory science and engineering research that are critical for 
sustaining growth in the knowledge-driven economies also are particularly exposed to the 
 
7 For further discussion of the significance of the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998), and 
the European Union Directive for the Legal Protection of Databases (1996), and the likelihood that measures of 
both kinds will come into force in both the U.S. and the EU, see P. A. David (2003c).  
 
8  For further treatment of these points, which are not developed here, one may consult David (2003d) 
and the references supplied therein.    4 
 
 
                                                          
adverse effects of the high access charges for data, information and research tools that the 
owners of legal monopoly rights are free to impose. Lack of restraint in privatizing the public 
domain in data and information, especially in regard to the sharing of access to raw data-
streams and information, thus have effect that augment and amplify the chronic under-
provision of documentation and annotation activities necessary to maintain reliably accurate 
and up-to-date public database resources. Both can significantly degrade the effectiveness of 
the research system as a whole. Considered at the macro-level, open science and 
commercially oriented R&D based upon proprietary information constitute complementary 
sub-systems. The public policy challenge that needs to be faced, consequently, is to keep the 
two sub-systems of open science and proprietary R&D in proper balance. This requires both 
adequate public funding of “open science” institutions and programs, and deliberate measures 
to halt, and in some areas reverse the excessive incursions of claims to private property rights 
over material that would otherwise remain in the public domain of scientific data and 
information.
9  
Nevertheless, today there are many writers in the business press, academic 
economists, lawyers and policy makers who see the matter quite differently. The centrality of 
information technologies and information goods in the phenomena that are associated with 
the New Economy has suggested that the world is now leaving behind the epoch of material 
capitalism and entering a new and different stage -- “Intellectual Capitalism.” Accordingly, 
on this view, the way forward calls for assuring the continued vitality of the market system 
through a combination of new institutional and technical innovations that would provide 
reliable control over “knowledge assets”, protecting holders of intellectual property rights 
from the potentially disruptive effects of the rapid advance of digital information technologies 
and computer-mediated telecommunications. In this vision of the brighter future, the dark 
threat that has to be contained is the one arising from the free and open circulation of ideas, 
data and information. 
 
  For readers with the range of “presentist” concerns that has just been reviewed, the 
thrust of the arguments set out in the following pages can simply be this: to pursue the policy 
path leading toward the vision of perfected “Intellectual Capitalism” would paradoxically 
lead us backwards, towards that truly darker past from which western European societies 
rather fortuitously managed to escape.  The modus of liberation – one could say 
“enlightenment”—was provided by the inter-twinning of intellectual and institutional 
transformations that first coupled the “Scientific Revolution” of the seventeenth century with 
the emergence of “open science,” and subsequently reinforced  the institutionalization and 
stabilization of public patronage of “open science” in a healthy, productive system of 
interactions with proprietary, commercially-oriented R&D activities. 
 
To closely read the history of those processes is a beginning step towards fully 
appreciating that the constellation of differentiated institutions that have supported and 
structured the conduct of scientific and technical research is a fragile cultural construct. It is 
the legacy of an extended, intricate and contingent historical process that cannot be assumed 
to have been generated by some underlying self-rebalancing, self-regenerating system that 
 
9  Much of the science policy literature has focused upon issues of funding, but legal and other 
institutional impediments to academic research collaborations, and a variety of ameliorative proposals are 




                                                          
requires no maintenance or protection. With this, as with other delicate pieces of (social) 
machinery, a substantial measure of caution and patience in seeking to more thoroughly 
understand its workings and the manner of its construction would seem a minimum that 
should be asked of those having the power to tinker with the institutional infrastructure of 
modern system of innovation; and particularly, when they are moved to do so by genuine 
aspirations fix one or another among the myriad (of often rather transient) societal problems 
that are likely to be brought to the notice of people in elected offices.     
 
At such a time as this, when proposals for quite radical institutional changes are in the 
air, it therefore may be particularly appropriate to pause for a look backward to the historical 
circumstances in which the social ethos and some of the key institutions of modern academic 
science first emerged. An examination of the strands of “internal” intellectual development in 
natural philosophy and the nexus of “external” economic, social and political forces that 
shaped the early process of institutionalization of ‘open science’ and its connections with the 
Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century, will at very least elicit some greater 
appreciation for the emergence of “open science” in western Europe as an extraordinary piece 
of cultural good fortune. It also may serve to heighten an awareness of the potentialities of 
unintended consequences – both good and bad – that are latent in efforts to quickly re-orient 
complex and venerable social institutions in order to serve purposes very remote from those 
for which the course of their historical evolution has left them well adapted.   
 
  Undertaking an inquiry of that kind asks that economists and economic historians 
suspend their probing of the interior of the ‘black box’ of technology, at least long enough to  
seek a clearer view of what goes on  inside the other major component of modern research 
system, the still relatively understudied “black box of science.” The open science system, if 
we may call it that, has only lately begun to be studied using the tools of economic analysis. 
Far more is understood about the evolving institutional structures affecting resource 
allocation and the mechanisms, and especially about the workings of the intellectual property 
mechanisms that enable private appropriation of research benefits, than is systematically 
known about the origins and effects of the corresponding institutional infrastructures shaping 
the economic organization of publicly supported R&D.
10
 
The desirability of closing this particular lacuna in the economics and economic 
history literatures has been no less evident to those who have approach it within a broader 
framework of concern with the economics of institutions, as it is for those who have observed 
it from the perspective of science and technology studies.  Even before the ‘new economics of 
science’ had begun to direct attention to such a program, Douglass North (1990:p. 75) 
characteristically perceived in it both a significant challenge and a promising opportunity: 
 
 
10 Within the past decade, however, the situation has begun to change. On the program to redress this 
comparative neglect through research in the microeconomics of resource allocation within publicly supported 
science, see Dasgupta and David (1987, 1994), David (1994b), the surveys by Diamond (1996), Stephan (1996), 
and David, Foray and Steinmueller (1999); note should be taken of the harvest of interesting and ingenious 
quantitative studies emerging from a younger generation of economists, including Arora, David and 
Gambardella (1998), Geuna (1999), Carayol and Dalle(2000), Carayol and Matt (2003). Nathan Rosenberg 
(1982: Ch. 7), while not himself delving into the ‘black box’ of the microeconomics of scientific research in 
universities and other non-commercial institutions, led the vanguard calling upon economists to recognize that 
the state of scientific knowledge should not be treated as exogenous to the economy’s development -- especially 
because the scientific enterprise continues to be shaped in many ways by specifically technological concerns. 6 
 
 
                                                          
    "The literature dealing with the origins and development of science is substantial, but 
I am not aware that much of it self-consciously explores the connecting links between 
institutional structures...and incentives to acquire pure knowledge." 
     
That was too strong a hint to be ignored, a growing company of economic and technological 
historians, along with economists of an historical persuasion, lately have begun to turn their 
attention to studying the scientific foundations of the modern “knowledge economy.”
11  
 
  The subject matter of this essay therefore can seen to be situated squarely at the 
intersection between the concerns of the new economics of science and the economic history 
of the production and distribution of knowledge, the economic analysis of social institutions, 
and current policy debates over the future organization of national science and technology 
programs. With this more than ample motivation serving to frame the historical inquiry, the 
obvious next step must be to fix precisely upon the set of key institutionalized norms and 
practices of modern scientific research systems call for more explicit analytical and empirical 
attention than economists and economic historians have hitherto accord to them. 
 
 
1. The puzzling phenomenon of “open science”   
 
The institutional features of prime interest here are those that distinguish most sharply 
the sphere of ‘open science’ (supported by public funding and the patronage of private 
foundations) from both the organized conduct of scientific research under commercially-
oriented ‘proprietary rules,’ and the production and procurement of defence-related scientific 
and engineering knowledge under conditions of restricted access to information concerning 
basic findings and actual or potential applications. 
  
  1.1 Ethos, norms and institutions  
 
Many of the key formal institutions of modern science already are quite familiar to 
academic economists and economic historians. It is a striking phenomenon, well noted in the 
sociology of science, that there is high degree of mimetic professional organization and 
behavior across the diverse cognitive domains of academic endeavor.  Whether in the social 
sciences, or the natural sciences, or the humanities for that matter, most fields have their 
professional academies and learned societies, journal refereeing procedures, public and 
private foundation grant programs, peer-panels for merit review of funding applications, 
organized competitions, prizes and public awards.  Within the sciences proper, however, there 
are recognized norms and conventions that constitute a clearly delineated ethos to which 
members of the academic research community generally are disposed to publicly subscribe, 
whether or not their individual behaviors conform literally to its strictures. The norms of ‘the 
Republic of Science’ that have famously been articulated by Robert K. Merton (1973) 




11 In addition to the works cited below as specifically germane to the institutional history on which this 
paper focuses, see the variety of topics addressed, e.g. by LJcuyer (1998), Lenoir (1998), Headrick (2000), 
Mokyr (2002), and Foray (2004). 




                                                          
 
  The ‘communal’ ethos emphasizes the cooperative character of inquiry, stressing that 
the accumulation of reliable knowledge is a social, rather than an individual program; 
however much individuals may strive to contribute to it, the production of knowledge which 
is ‘reliable’ is fundamentally a social process.  The precise nature and import of the new 
knowledge therefore ought not be of such personal interest to the researcher as to impede its 
availability or detract from its reliability in the hands of co-workers in the field.  Research 
agendas, as well as findings ought therefor to be under the control of personally (or 
corporately) disinterested agents. The force of the universalistic norm is to allow entry into 
scientific work and discourse to be open to all persons of ‘competence’, regardless of their 
personal and ascriptive attributes.  A second aspect of ‘openness’ concerns the disposition of 
knowledge: the full disclosure of findings, and methods, form a key aspect of the cooperative, 
communal program of inquiry. Disclosure serves the ethos legitimating, and, indeed 
prescribing skepticism, for it is that which creates an expectation that all claims to have 
contributed to the stock of reliable knowledge will be subjected to trials of verification, 
without insult to the claimant.  The ‘originality’ of such intellectual contributions is the 
touchstone for the acknowledgment of individual claims, upon which collegiate reputations 
and the material and non-pecuniary rewards attached to such peer evaluations are based.  
 
1.2 The problem: In a world of secret knowledge, why “open” science? 
 
  An essential, defining feature of modern science thus is found in its public, collective 
character, and its commitment to cooperative inquiry and to free sharing of knowledge.   
While to most of us the idea of science as the pursuit of "public knowledge" seems a natural, 
indeed a ‘primitive’ conceptualization, it is actually a social contrivance; and by historical 
standards, a comparatively recent innovation at that, having taken form only as recently as the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Accompanying the epistemological transformation 
effected by the fusion of  ‘experimentalism’ with Renaissance mathematics, the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries witnessed a transition from the previously dominant ethos of 
secrecy in the pursuit of Nature’s Secrets, to a new set of norms, incentives, and 
organizational structures. These reinforced scientific researchers' commitments to rapid 
disclosure and wider dissemination of their new discoveries and inventions. 
 
   Rather surprisingly, the puzzle of how this came about has only lately come to be 
noticed among historians of science. The comparative inattention accorded to this particular 
problem may be attributable in large measure to the quite understandable preoccupation of 
historians of western science with “the big questions”: uncovering the origins and driving 
forces in the Scientific Revolution in 17
th century, accounting for the uniqueness of the 
ensuing European achievements in the advancement knowledge in the natural sciences, and 
explaining why the flowering of scientific knowledge in other cultures, places and eras – 
notably classical Greece, Islam,  and China – did not similarly attain a sustaining cumulative 
momentum.
13 Although forming a clearly distinct ‘problematique,’ the neglected historical 
puzzle taken up here involves aspects of the Scientific Revolution that may hold some of the 
answers to those “big questions” that hitherto have tended to obscure it from view. That, at 
least, is a possibility broached at several points in the course of the present argument. 
 
13 H. Floris Cohen’s (1994) comprehensive historiography of the Scientific Revolution admirably helps 
disentangle the foregoing three quite different “problems.” But it shares the silence of that literature on questions 
concerning the historical emergence of the ethos of ‘public knowledge’ and ‘open science.’ This is somewhat 
less understandable, in view of Cohen’s otherwise penetrating critical expositions. 8 
 
 
                                                          
 
  Even the most superficial acquaintance with the antecedent intellectual orientation and 
social organization of scientific research in the West suggests the utter improbability of a 
bifurcation of this kind, in which the germ of a new and quite antithetical mode of organizing 
the pursuit of knowledge appeared alongside the secretive search for ‘Nature's Secrets.’   
Putting the point differently, virtually all of the antecedent conditions inveighed against 
‘openness’ of inquiry and public disclosure of discoveries about the natural order of the 
world, much less of the heavens.  In classical Greece, science developed within the paradigm 
of competitive public debate, which operated to solidify knowledge into separate schools of 
thought and militated against collaboration among scientists directed toward a single goal.  
Medieval science, shaped by a political and religious outlook that encouraged withholding the 
"secrets of nature" from the "vulgar multitude,” similarly made scant contribution to the 
development of the concept of openness, even though there were some individuals who 
thought it important to commit their knowledge to books meant to be shared with certain 
others. 
   
  A work that played an influential role in moulding medieval attitudes toward the 
disclosure of knowledge was the pseudo-Aristotelian Kitab Sirr al-Asrar ("The Book of the 
Secret of Secrets") known to Europeans as the Secretum secretorum, which Lynn Thorndike 
(1950, v. II: 267) characterized as "the most popular book in the middle ages." It professed to 
reveal the deepest, esoteric wisdom of Aristotle, while promulgating the idea in elusive, 
enigmatic terminology, that because this secret knowledge could make possible limitless 
things in the material world, it had to be kept hidden from the eyes of the "unworthy.”   This 
was reinforced by other traditions in medieval literature that portrayed the goddess Natura as 
being modestly veiled, and hostile to an open disclosure of her secrets. 
   
  The moral obligation to be circumspect in matters concerning the secrets of nature 
was thus, as William Eamon (1985: 325) has phrased it, "a conviction woven into the very 
fabric of medieval thought."  The imperative of secrecy was particularly strongly developed 
in the medieval and Renaissance traditions of Alchemy, where it was to persist throughout the 
seventeenth century and into the eighteenth, side by side with the emergent institutions of 
open science.  Alchemy was regarded as a form of personal knowledge, a "divine science" 
rather than a science of nature; according to Dobbs (1975: 27), "alchemy never was, and 
never was intended to be, solely a study of matter for its own sake"; it was not a rational 
branch of natural philosophy, but rather, "a way of life, a great work which absorbed all [of 
the alchemist’s] mental and material resources...."
14  The knowledge whose possession was 
claimed by alchemists had to be gained through a combination of divine illumination and 
reason leading to inner sensations of secret understanding, on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, experimentation  (labors "at the furnace,” so to speak). 
 
 
14 Vickers (1984:9) makes the related point that in Renaissance Europe the occult mentality was not 
interested in nature for the sake of understanding per se; rather the underlying questions are primarily self-
interested.  Will I be happy? Wealthy? Will I be healthy? How long can I live?  These are questions in which 
knowledge is an instrumentality, a means to an end, but a private rather than a public purpose.  The socialization 
of modern "scientists" to reject of such questions as "unworthy" is recognized as an element in the Science-
Technology differentiation found at the sociological level.  This may be a legacy from the official rejection of 
occult studies in the Renaissance universities, even while they were being tolerated for private study (see 




                                                          
Because the fruits of this mixture transcended the descriptive powers of ordinary 
language, on that account if on no other, they were hardly fit subjects for broadcast 
communications. Alchemical texts deliberately employed obscure symbols, paradoxes, 
allegories and secret names, for the purpose of guaranteeing the protection of divine secrets 
and their retention within a small circle of intimates who were bound to secrecy. Robert 
Boyle who was well acquainted with members such a circle in London, found it apparent 
from “their obscure, ambiguous, and almost enigmatical way of expressing what they pretend 
to teach, that they have no mind to be understood at all, but by the sons of the art.”
15    In the 
newer practice of "chemical alchemy" that was fostered in mid-seventeenth century England 
(through the fusion of mechanical philosophy with the older alchemical tradition), the 
notation and associated concepts became increasingly standardized, and on that account more 
readily decipherable. Yet, the maintenance of the tradition of secrecy and the cryptographic 
character of manuscripts persisted even in the voluminous unpublished alchemical writings of 
Isaac Newton – which continued throughout the century, and are reported by Newton’s 
modern biographer Richard Westfall (1980) to have run to more than 1,200,000 words.
16   
 
  Social and economic regulations, along with the relatively primitive and costly 
technologies available for scientific communications, reinforced the moral and philosophical 
considerations that were arrayed during the middle ages against open disclosure of discovered 
"secrets.”  Technological recipes normally were not broadcast by medieval and early modern 
Europe’s craftsmen, especially not those constrained by the regulations of the urban craft-
guilds aimed at preserving the "mysteries" of their industrial arts.
17  Pamela Long (1991) has 
made the important point that the medieval guilds fostered the conceptualization of 
knowledge of industrial practices as intangible assets, the economical value of which 
warranted protection. Secrecy, above all, was the characteristic mode through which the 
private benefits of craft knowledge were appropriated. 
 
 The economic aspects of Long’s (1991) thesis in regard to the effects of medieval 
guild policies upon both secrecy and the dissemination of (craft) knowledge are somewhat 
 
15 See Eamon (1994: p. 341) for this extract from Boyle’s “Skeptical Chymist” (1661). In reflecting  
upon the participation of leading scientific figures of this era such as Boyle, and Newton in these hidden, 
instrumentally purposive investigations, one cannot help but notice a striking and perhaps disturbing element of 
resemblance between the norms governing proprietary information guarded by the profit-motivated “start-up” 
companies in which academic scientists in the modern era have involved themselves, and the conventions of 
secrecy that traditionally prevailed among practitioners of the occult arts.  
 
16 On Newton’s studies of alchemical texts and engagement in experimental researches, see also the 
monograph by Dobbs (1975) and the detailed evidence that Figala and Petzold (1993) present about his 
sustained personal contacts with the circle of fellow alchemists in London.  
17 Among recent discussions of medieval and early modern craft guild practices in this regard, see the 
excellent discussion by Long (1991: pp.870-881) of secrecy as the characteristic mode of protecting technical 
knowledge that was recognized to be of economic value. Epstein (2002, 2004) advances a reinterpretation of the 
economic effects of Europe’s urban craft guilds, emphasizing instead their positive role in the dissemination of 
industrial knowledge and contributions to the region’s technological dynamism. While the argument and 
evidence are on balance persuasive when taken in the context of the comparisons that Epstein (2002) draws 
between China and Europe in renaissance and early modern epochs, they fail when offered in refutation of the 
view that guild regulations promoted industrial secrecy and obstructed the working of new inventions. This is 
implied by the points briefly noted in the following paragraphs, which draw upon the more “traditional” 
interpretations of urban craft guild regulations (e.g., Thrupp 1942, Throop 1963, Smith 1963, Unwin 1964) as 
displaying all the lineaments, and effects of monopolistic cartels.  10 
 
 
                                                          
subtle, and so when stating its details, some special care is appropriate. But the nub of the 
argument turns on the point that although information has the economic properties of a public 
good, it nonetheless may be held tightly secret for private exploitation, or it may be a secret 
that is collectively maintained among the members of a private consortium who are thus able 
to exploit it for commercial purposes as “a club good.”
18 Although the craft guilds did 
nothing to prevent the first of these modes of private appropriation, one effect of their 
industrial policies facilitated the limited sharing of craft knowledge as “club goods.” But a 
secret is still a secret, not a matter that is “open” for wide diffusion as common knowledge; 
craft guilds did not draw the circles of knowledge-sharing so tightly as did the traditions in 
force among the alchemists, but their economic interests and regulatory powers worked in 
ways that restricted the dissemination and growth of technical knowledge more tightly that 
would be expected if the structure of their industries had been competitive.
19
 
  The craft-guilds anti-competitive practices had unintended as well as intended 
consequences impeding the diffusion of industrial production knowledge. First, within the 
town, the first-order effect of regulations forbidding poaching of apprentices, and the 
restraints on the raiding of skilled workers from the establishments of other guild masters, 
was to reduce opportunities for superior practices (workshop secrets) to be imparted to a 
larger number of artisans, thereby indirectly decreasing the chances for still wider 
dissemination beyond the ambit of the town. Secondly, while medieval and early modern 
cities and towns as a rule were open to migrants (indeed, in view of the net mortality the 
population of adults could be sustained only by in-migration), foreign journeyman (those who 
had not served as an apprentice to one of the guild’s masters) were as a rule not employable 
there. In view of the fact that few industrial craft practices were recorded in forms that would 
permit them to be transmitted except through immediate human agency, this restraint on the 
wider physical circulation of skilled artisans reinforced the geographical “balkanization” of 
technological knowledge.  
 
 
18  Although the existence today of trade secrecy statutes in some legal jurisdictions has led to modern 
the inclusion of trade secrets, along with patents, copyrights and trademarks under the general rubric of 
“intellectual property,” legal theory supports the view that the rights protected under trade secrecy laws are 
rights to enter contracts of confidentiality, and not strict “property rights.” It is certainly undeniable that 
historically they derive from the common law governing master-servant relations. See further discussion and 
references in David (1993: pp. 30-32.)  
  
19Craft guilds were chartered ‘corporate’ entities that governed the conduct of the major urban 
industries in Western Europe during in this era (and during much of the early modern period) very much in the 
manner of producer cartels. The guild-masters of a locale sought collectively to function very much along the 
lines of joint profit-maximizing monopolists in their respective product markets, and as labor market 
monopsonists with respect to the labor market of their town. Thus, they regulated competition among the guild’s 
members, restricted their output, and restrained masters from poaching apprentices and journeymen from one 
another. While they favored inducements for journeymen and less skilled works to settle in their city, they took 
steps to inhibit skilled artisans from leaving to work elsewhere, especially in neighboring locales that might 
otherwise form a market for the guild’s transportable products; on some occasions, the might even resort to more 
direct, violent means of suppressing the establishment of competing production facilities in beyond the particular 
urban domain within which they legitimately were able to exercise regulatory controls. See, e.g.,Thrupp (1963) 
pp. 230-280; 624-634. The foregoing summary, although stated in more abstract analytical terms may also be 
seen to fit closely the specific regulations and policies of the glassmakers’ guild in Venice, described in some 
detail by Long (1991: pp. 870-875) – but which have been construed quite differently by subsequent 
commentators (e.g., Merges 2004), ostensibly following the reinterpretation of the role of the craft-gilds by 
Epstein (1998).  
  11 
 
 
                                                          
Even though the absence of regulations against the movement of journeymen among 
the workshops of the town could facilitate exchanges of craft knowledge locally, it did not 
inhibit the efforts of individual masters to keep their own industrial secrets. Nor was it 
incompatible with guild sanctions against masters who carelessly permitted their skilled 
artisans to work in public view, where their methods might be observed by anyone that 
passed by.
20 Indeed, the indirect effect of the guild’s joint monopolistic (cartel) position 
created positive incentives for the members to guard information regarding idiosyncratic 
practices that supported product differentiation (distinctive shaping, coloration and finishing 
of their wares). The analytical argument goes this way: Product market monopolists have 
weaker incentives than do firms in competitive industries when it comes to introducing 
introduce technical innovations. Their readiness to invest in technological invention (their 
own, or those of others) will be the weaker on that account. This invention-inhibiting effect of 
monopoly vis-à-vis competition is the greater, the greater (more ‘drastic’) is the unit cost 
reduction afforded by the inventions in question, all of which has been made quite familiar by 
Arrow (1962). Therefore one hardly should be surprised by the fact that where entrenched 
craft-guild monopolies exercised control over an extensive national territory – which was still 
the case in France for most of the eighteenth century, it was only readiness of an absolute 
monarch to grant privilPges  enabling production of new goods and the working novel 
techniques that operated to counteract those institutions’ generally baleful influence upon 
industrial innovation.
21 Given the (rational) expectation on the part of a guild master that the 
other members of his corporation would not be any more favorably disposed towards the 
introduction of novelties into their trade than was he, the expected rate of obsolescence of 
their craft methods would be lower. Consequently, and the expected present value of devoting 
resources to keeping secret the “mysterie” surrounding existing products and methods would 
tend to be greater.   
 
Of course, the alternative to secrecy (in its several forms) was disclosure under grants 
of privileges that would permit the revealed knowledge to be commercially exploited without 
hindrance. Prior to the enactment of patent laws (the first of which dates from 1474 in 
Venice) and the regular granting of "letters patent" providing monopoly privileges in 
exchange for the introduction of new arts, engineers and inventors were particularly reluctant 
to divulge the secrets of their inventions. Before the seventeenth century, the typical objective 
of the grant of an industrial “patents” was not to stimulate “invention” in the modern sense of 
the term; rather it was to elicit the migration of foreign artisans would could introduce into 
the grantor’s dominion, and establish therein a craft that was already known elsewhere. The 
necessity of training apprentices entailed sharing knowledge of the new art; since that would 
eventually create journeymen for others to employ, an potential rival masters in the new 
locale, the patent provided a period of protection from competitive entry that might suffice to 
reward the foreign artisan for the trouble and expenses of the move.
22  Similarly, knowledge 
 
20 Eamons (1994: p. 84) cites ordinances to this effect that were issued by the London Pewterers’ 
Company in the seventeenth century. 
 
21 See Hilaire-Perez (1991), and the more extensive treatment in Hilaire-PJrez (2000), esp. pp. 136-142. 
22 The modern English term "patent" derives from the medieval practice of announcing grants of 
privileges and protections by royal proclamations, or "Letterae Patentes," i.e., Open Letters.  As early as the 
fourteenth century such grants were being employed by the English crown to encourage the introduction of 
foreign technologies such as the building of windmills, or the weaving of linen, through the transfer of skilled 
craftsmen from abroad. See Hill (1924), Prager (1944), David (1993). For analysis of the economic basis and 
implications of this generally overlook aspect of patents, see also David and Olsen (1992).  12 
 
 
                                                          
of recently discovered geographical secrets that had commercial value, such as trade routes, 
would be kept from the public domain.  Maps based upon voyages of discovery in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were regarded as especially valuable and were either 
suppressed or guarded to prevent their falling into the possession of maritime and commercial 
rivals.
23
Why then, out of such a background of obfuscation and secrecy, should there have 
emerged a quite distinctive community of inquiry into the nature of the physical world, 
holding different norms regarding disclosure, and being governed by a distinctive reward 
system based upon priority of discovery?  Why so, especially when in the modern context it 
appears that there is little in the chosen methods of (scientific) inquiry that would suffice to 
distinguish the investigative techniques used by university scientists working under the 
institutional norms of open science from the procedures that they (or others with the same 
training) would employ in the setting of a corporate R&D laboratory? 
 
The emergence of the idea that humanity would benefit from the concerted collective 
pursuit of public knowledge, and of the conventions and norms supporting the practice of 
“open science" appears to have been a distinctive and vital organizational aspect of the 
Scientific Revolution. Is the social organization of open science simply an epiphenomenon of 
the profound philosophical and religious reorientations that have been presented as 
underlying the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century?  Or, should we instead see 
the Scientific Revolution as the product of what might be called the "Open Science 
Revolution”? More reasonably, were these two discontinuities -- the one taking place in the 
social organization of scientific inquiry and the other transforming its intellectual 
organization -- interdependent and entangled with each other in ways that remain 
insufficiently understood?  Some clearer insight into the problem may be gained by turning to 
the economic logic of the organization of knowledge producing activities.  
 
  
2. The ‘logical origins’ of Open Science and the problem of ‘historical origins’  
 
  Indeed, it is quite possible to construct a functionalist account of the institutional 
complex that characterizes modern science, one that argues for the greater economic and 
social utility of the ideology of the open pursuit of knowledge and the norms of cooperation 
among scientists. Moreover, one can also demonstrate the "incentive compatibility" (with the 
norm of disclosure) of a collegiate reputation-based reward system grounded upon validated 
claims to priority in discovery or invention.
24  The core of the rationale that I have offered (in 
 
23 On maps and secrecy see, e.g., Boorstin (1983: 267-78). The one field of industrial technology that 
presents a striking exception to these generalization is that of metallurgy and metal mining, in which the 
sixteenth century saw a rapid proliferation not only of printed handbooks containing practical recipes (often 
alchemical in style), but informative books on mining engineering and assaying by German authors, notably De 
re Metallica by Agricola [Georg Bauer, 1490-1555] which appeared in 1556, and the treatise on ores and 
assaying published in Prague in 1574 by Lazarus Ercker [d. 1593], superintendent of the mines in the Holy 
Roman Empire. (See, e.g., Hall (1983: pp. 241-242). It may be remarked that the mining of minerals was 
conducted by royal monopolies in the principalities of Europe during this era. Hence, the disclosure of 
techniques for the more efficient exploitation of these assets would not have been detrimental to the profitability 
of these enterprises. See Hirschliefer and Riley (1979) on the generality of this familiar point in the theoretical 
literature on the “appropriability problem.”  
24  A rationale of precisely this kind is developed by Dasgupta and David (1987, 1994). See David 
(2003a) for a more recent restatement and elaboration. 13 
 
 
earlier papers written with Partha Dasgupta) to "account for" the peculiar information-
disclosure norms and social organization of modern science is concerned with the greater 
efficacy of open inquiry and complete disclosure as a basis for the cooperative, cumulative 
generation of predictably reliable additions to the stock of knowledge.  In brief, openness 
abets rapid validation of findings, reduces excess duplication of research effort, enlarges the 
domain of complementaries and beneficial ‘spill-overs’ among research programs. 
 
  The advantages of treating new findings as "public goods" in order to promote the 
faster growth of the stock of knowledge are to be contrasted with the requirements of secrecy 
for the purposes of extracting material benefits from possession of information that can be 
privately held as intellectual property.  Suppressing the details of the argument which turns 
upon the difficulties of monitoring research effort, and the consequent need to tie the reward 
system to observable outputs, and hence to priority in revelation of purported ‘findings’, the 
main point can be put in the following overly stark, unqualified way.  We may say that 
whereas Technology (qua social organization) is devoted to maximizing wealth stocks 
corresponding to the current and future flows of economic rents, and so requires the control 
of knowledge through secrecy, or exclusive possession of the right to its commercial   
exploitation,  Science (qua social organization) is about maximizing the rate of growth of the 
stock of knowledge, for which purposes public knowledge and hence patronage or public 
subsidization of scientists is required.  This functional juxtaposition suggests a logical 
argument for the existence and perpetuation of institutional and cultural separations between 
the communities of researchers forming ‘the Republic of Science’ and those engaged in 
proprietary scientific pursuits within ‘the Realm of Technology’: the two distinctive 
organizational regimes serve quite different but potentially complementary societal purposes. 
  
  2.1 Functionalism without context: the problem with ‘logical origins’  
 
In what sense can that be taken to constitute an explanation?   In seeking to uncover 
the "logical origins" of the institutions of modern science in their presently observable 
functional value, this style of argument ignores the details of their historical evolution.   
Rather, the most persuasive economic rationale that can be constructed along those lines 
would seem to presuppose these arrangements were instituted by some external agency, such 
as an informed and benevolent political authority endowed with fiscal powers.  Of course, 
once the idea of the open, cooperative pursuit of knowledge had been translated into 
established practice, even among very informal and loosely organized networks of scientists, 
it would become quite reasonable to entertain the hypothesis that the functional value of that 
mode of inquiry could commend it to other, more self-conscious groups bent upon some 
collective purpose. Thus, kings and princes and their ministers, legislative bodies, and other 
public patrons subsequently might play important parts in its formal institutionalization. 
 
  Consequently, where the ahistorical functionalist, "logical origins" style of 
explanation falters most obviously is when we demand to be told why and how -- through a 
spontaneous and undirected process, possibly driven by the self-interests of the individual 
human actors -- the rule of full disclosure and cooperation in the search for knowledge, could 
ever otherwise have come to be established in the first place.  After all, the modern economic 
analysis of the so-called "appropriability problem" identified by Nelson (1959) and Arrow 
(1962), emphasizes that "openness" in science sets the stage for a market failure due to free-
riding behavior: the beneficiaries are reluctant to pay for the costs of generating new 




To respond satisfactorily to this last line of objections, we have to inquire into the 
institution’s "historical origins.” These may or may not be the same as the "logical origins" 
that we are led to perceive by considering the contemporary functional value of the open 
mode of scientific inquiry in a historically distant social setting. 
 
  2.2 Historical origins: the problems with Eamon’s explanation 
 
  Among the very few historians of western science who have directly addressed this 
aspect of the origins of modern scientific institutions, William Eamon (1985, 1994:esp. 
Ch.10) is notable for having not only documented, but proposed to explain the sixteenth 
century shift in the conception of science from that of the discovery and preservation of 
nature's secrets within elect brotherhoods of scientists, to complete and public disclosure of 
new knowledge. Following the work of Webster (1970) and others, he depicts the 
transformation that occurred in seventeenth century England as the product of converging 
intellectual movements of reform.  One of these was Francis Bacon's polemic against the 
tyranny of philosophical systems ossified by unchanging subservience to intellectual 
"authority”, and his program to foster the progress of knowledge by reorganizing the 
scientific community for greater cooperation and communication along lines inspired by the 
mechanical arts. A second is found by Eamon in Puritan social reform politics, and 
particularly the influence of the ideas advanced by the circle around Samuel Hartlib, who saw 
collaboration among scientists and inventors as means of achieving universal knowledge, the 
unity of religion, and the improvement of human welfare. 
  
  The nearest Eamon (1985,1994:esp.Ch.10) comes to offering a materialist explanation 
for the emergence of open science is to suggest that the progress of the "useful arts" as set 
down in the literary form of “books of secrets,” and in accounts of the results of 
experimentation in the alchemical tradition, eventually became available for circulation as 
printed books. According to the argument, this furnished the virtuosi of the early seventeen 
century with a model of what a distributed, open organization of knowledge acquisition might 
do for the advancement of scientific understanding. Thus, in the Novum Organum published 
in 1620, Francis Bacon [1561-1626] contrasted the power of cumulative improvement and 
confirmation by many practitioners, with the stagnation of thought in the ancient 
philosophical traditions. Natural philosophers, according to Eamon, had been led by the 
technological writers’ evidence of the progress around them to reappraise the collaborative, 
social nature of knowledge acquisition in the artisan tradition, and they generalized upon this 
to arrive at a prescription for the reorganization of investigations into the workings of nature. 
 
A number of difficulties bedevil this line of explanation. The first concerns those 
“books of secrets” about the practical arts. It is undeniable that with the spread of literacy in 
the late middle ages, some technological practitioners began to compile what Eamon (1994: 
pp. 82-89) initially describes as “craft secrets” in handbooks intended for the training of other 
artisans or to “stake claims to their inventions.” Were one were to go no further, it would be 
easy to form the impression of a surprising fashion spreading among ordinary craft-artisans 
who sought to reveal the very knowledge upon possession of which their livelihoods 
depended.  Such a picture would be not only paradoxical, but misleading. Out of “literally 
dozens of examples of the writings craftsmen produced” by the end of the fifteenth century, 
an illustrative “sample” of only three texts is presented. Significantly, they form a rather 
different picture, one on which Eamon discussion fails to comment. First in the sample is the 15 
 
 
                                                          
manuscript treatise on the arts of painting, glassmaking and metalwork by Theophilus, a 
twelfth-century German Benedictine monk.  Next comes a better-known treatise on the care 
of vineyards and orchards, composed c. 1350 by the Bavarian, Gottfried of Franconia -- most 
probably he too was a cleric who and acquired his skills when engaged with just such matters 
on the Whrzberg estates of the prince-bishop which were under the administration of 
ecclesiastical ordinaries.
25 Eamon’s third offering is a 1389 manuscript on metallurgy by a 
Nuremberg “blacksmith and experimenter, ” which opens with a learned reference to “meister 
alkaym” and goes on to detail numerous recipes for substances supposedly efficacious in 
quenching and tempering of knives.
26 It seems rather unlikely that writer intended it for 
circulation beyond the circle of alchemical adepts.  My purpose in entering into these details 
goes beyond noticing that monastic artisans and horticulturalists would be better equipped to 
produce literary works than the literate craftsmen of this era. While that much is apparent to 
Eamon (1994: p.82), his discussion omits notice of the obtrusive coincidence that the two 
“sharers of artisinal secrets” actually were not directly engaged in business.  They belonged to 
religious orders, where they might have hoped to advance their status by calling attention to 
their expertise (or perhaps gain support for wider European research-travels?). These were 
people that would have had something to gain, rather than something valuable to lose by 
advertising what they knew; their stories therein hold a clue about the directions in which to 
look for explanations of the later emergence of the more widespread disclosures of “expert” 
knowledge. 
  The next difficulty concerns Eamon’s contention that by the early seventeenth century  
the mathematicians and scientific virtuosi had fallen under the spell of Bacon’s vision, 
persuaded by the correlation between the evident progress of industry and growing circulation 
of revealed practical knowledge in printed “books of secrets.” Suffice it to say that this part of 
the argument sits most awkwardly alongside Eamon's ample acknowledgments that secrecy 
remained the norm in the realm of technical invention and industrial practice; that 
consequently, the Royal Society of London’s efforts during the 1660s and 1670s to compile a 
Baconian “History of Trade” was notably unsuccessful in opening up the crafts to public 
view.
27   He might have noticed too that in contemporary Paris the newly founded royal 
academy of sciences was hardly more effective than the Royal Society in drawing forth and 
codifying industrial knowledge from craft practitioners. Not until the middle of the next 
 
25 Gottfried reported his extensive travels, in the course of which he appears to have exchanged 
information and techniques on orchard care with an English Benedictine monk in Flanders, Nicholas Bollard, 
another who wrote a book about the planting and grafting of fruit trees. Eamon’s surmise that both of them were 
clerics seems more than merely plausible. 
 
26 The contents of the latter seem (at least to this non-“adept” reader) to belong less to craft practice 
than to the tradition of arcane medieval magical and experimentation described by Thorndike (1950 If Newton 
could hold a Cambridge fellowship which also supported his alchemical pursuits, three centuries earlier a 
Nuremberg blacksmith also make enough of a living to support his sideline as a magus.  
27 See Eamon (1994: pp. 7, 299, 342-345, 348). Bacon (1994: pp. 26, 197-198) calls for the compiling of 
“histories” of the mechanical arts as “Instances of the Ingenuity or Hand of Man” (as well as compilations of  
“Boundary Instances,” i.e., anomalies and monsters in Nature). The project was taken up as the “History of 
Trades” by the early Royal Society of London, many of whose founding members regarded their institution as 
the realization of the utopian community of cooperating scientists envisaged in Bacon’s New Atlantis.   
Interestingly enough, it was on the very eve of the Society’s formal organization, when the project was under 
active discussion, that one of its distinguished future members warned of the deliberate obscurantism of the 
alchemical tradition as one among the obstacles that lay in the path of such an endeavor: see the passage from 
Robert Boyle’s “Skeptical Chymist” (1661), quoted by Eamon (1994: p. 341).  16 
 
 
                                                          
century did a marked shift of become evident in this regard, signalled by the concurrent 
appearance of the EncylopJdie (1751-65) and the Descriptions des arts et des mJtiers (1761-
88) -- the AcadJmie des Science’s own fulfilment of the old Baconian quest for a History of 
Trades.  Indeed, Robin Briggs’ (1991:p. 39) study of the archives covering the preceding era 
concludes that until the 1690’s the institution’s “genuine aspirations towards utilitarian 
science had only a minimal bearing on industry.” This was due not only to the inclinations of 
the academicians toward the abstract treatment even of mechanical questions that had 
recognizable technological applications, and to the ineffectuality of their understanding of 
matters in applied chemistry. Craft-guild obstructions continued to impede direct inquiries 
into existing industrial operations.
28  Pamela Long (1991: p. 916) concurs in the latter view,  
referring to project of the Descriptions des arts et des mJtiers as “an attempt to penetrate the 
secrecy that was commonplace among craftsmen.” 
 
  Where that not enough, yet another problem deserves notice. If Baconian ideology of 
open knowledge thoroughly pervaded the Puritan reformers around the social philosopher 
Samuel Hartlib [d. 1662], and was therefore fervently embraced by the community of public-
spirited new scientists in England who came under that influence, one would not expect to 
find that the older habits of secrecy could persist even within those circles.  Yet, we have the 
counter-example of Isaac Newton, and other distinguished scientific figures such as Robert 
Boyle.
29   In the view of B.Y.T. Dobbs (1975), the leading modern historian of Newton's 
alchemy, the fact that Newton never published a single scientific paper based upon the intense 
researches he devoted to the production of "philosophical mercury” (and which his 
manuscripts recorded in great detail) should not lead us to surmise that Newton's observations 
of "animated mercuries" amalgamated with gold were the products of a disordered mind.  Nor 
is it right to suppose that having failed in an irrationally deviant enterprise, Newton would 
have had nothing of any interest, let alone public interest to disclose about the business.  
Instead, Dobbs adduces a piece of his correspondence with Henry Oldenberg, the Secretary to 
the Royal Society, in support of an alternative and simpler explanation for Newton's public 
silence about this aspect of his work.  Namely, that he thought it was not safe to "go public" 
with alchemical knowledge.
30  Evidently, mentalité is a complicated matter. Two quite 
 
28 The early cohorts among the academicians appointed were strongly pre-disposed to pursue practical 
questions at an abstract level, as Briggs (1991:pp.45-46) makes plain in the following characteristically ironic 
illustration: “Roberta, Huygens, EdmJ Mariotte and Jacques Buot investigated the optimum size wheels for 
ploughs and carts, agreeing that big ones were preferable, but there is no sign of any rustic experiment to test 
this theoretical conclusion.” Even had they been naturally impelled towards engaging in “industrial field 
research,” such inquiries would not have proceeded without obstruction. In 1670 the academy was ordered by 
Colbert prepare models of the machines in use at a ribbon manufacture in Chevruese and at a silk-twist 
manufacture in Paris, which he wished to have placed in his library. To accomplish this, Colbert also had to 
direct that those manufactories permit an Jleve of the AcadJmie (Antoine de Niquet [1641-1726], who had 
engineering training) to visit the premises in order to inspect and take measurements of the machinery. See 
Briggs (1991:p.45); on Niquet’s background and career, see Sturdy (1995: pp. 129-133).   
29 Like Newton, Boyle was involved in a London-based circle of alchemists, and, as Eamon (1994: 341-
342) notes, felt an obligation to keep the secret the knowledge that had been imparted to him in that context.   
30  Newton, who believed so strongly in the prisca sapientia -- an original wisdom or knowledge in the 
ancients which had been mostly lost to mankind -- also took the old alchemical writers at their word that the 
secrets they sought to penetrate involved "other things besides ye transmutation of metalls,” things of an obscure 




                                                          
opposed attitudes concerning the desirability of revealing one's scientific discoveries could 
and did co-exist within the mind of this paragon of the Scientific Revolution. One was linked 




  Although it would be only sensible to firmly reject any wholly materialist dismissal of 
the power of intellectual currents to motivate alterations in social behavior and institutions, I 
remain less than fully persuaded by the arguments of historians of science that the 
institutional innovations of open science followed simply and directly from a wholesale 
overthrow of the medieval outlook and traditions of secrecy; and that, fortuitously, they first 
came to be crystallized in the Italian academies that attracted noble patronage early in the 
seventeenth century, setting a model for more formal institutionalization in the Royal Society 
of London and the AcadJmie royale des Sciences that subsequently was followed by the 
many scientific bodies created later in that image.
32  
 
Part of the problem with this mode of explanation is that it gives all the action to a few 
institutional reformers, portraying most among the new breed of "scientists" as passive 
participants who accept the new ideology, and docilely accommodate to the entailed 
revolution in their reward structure. Implicitly, they appear to altruistically offer themselves 
for the new, collaborative crusade for the improvement of society by means of the 
advancement of knowledge, even though this will oblige them to share potentially valuable 
information freely with others.  A further difficulty is that it remains unclear why this reform 
movement should have swept the ranks of those who had been dealing in the secrets of 
nature, yet stopped when it reached those who dealt in the secrets of the technological and 
commercial arts.  Rather than banishing secrecy and universally instituting full disclosure, 
two distinctive communities in the knowledge-seeking business had been brought into co-
existence.  
 
  Instead of simply viewing the latter organizational innovations as somehow deriving 
automatically from the intellectual changes represented by the new style of ‘scientific’ 
activity, I suggest that emergence of the norms of disclosure and demonstration, and the rise 
of “cooperative rivalries” in the revelation of new knowledge, had independent and 
antecedent roots.  They constituted a functional response to heightened asymmetric 
information problems that had been posed for the Renaissance system of court-patronage of 
the arts and sciences. The pre-existing informational asymmetries between noble patrons and 
their savants-clients had been exacerbated by the claims of mathematicians and the increasing 
practical reliance upon new mathematical techniques in a variety of “contexts of application.”  
Disclosure of both new knowledge and reliable techniques for solving practical problems 
offered a means for the mutual validation of claims to expertise, and public challenges and 
competitions among the mathematically adept provided a vehicle for building reputational 
renown. 
 
31 See the related conclusion of Figala and Petzold (1993: p.10-191) that Newton’s fusion – or was it a 
“straddling” -- of Renaissance and Enlightenment approaches in his theoretical designs was supported by his 
personal acquaintances with a natural philosopher and with a “hermetical philosopher,” upon both of whom he 
called for assistance during his later career in London. 
32  On this interpretation of formation of the pioneer public scientific societies, see Brown (1934/1967), 
Ornstein (1963). 18 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
3. Noble patrons, mathematicians, and principal-agent problems 
 
   The system of aristocratic patronage of creative activity--the patronage of bishops, 
kings, dukes and princes--had become firmly rooted in Western Europe during the Late 
Renaissance.
33  As such, it constituted a key feature of the socio-economic context within 
which the Baconian program in Natural Philosophy emerged.  This conjuncture was 
particularly important for the institutional development of open science. 
 
3.1 Motivations for patronage --  the utilitarian and the ornamental  
 
Aristocratic patronage systems have reflected two kinds of motivation: utilitarian and 
ornamental.  Most rulers have recognized some need in their domain or in their courts for 
men capable of producing new ideas and inventions to solve problems connected with 
warfare and security, land reclamation, food production, transport facilities, and so forth.  The 
potentes among men have long sought the services of those who professed an ability to reveal 
the secrets of Nature, and of Destiny, and if one had the wits there was always a living to be 
made in satisfying such needs.  Moreover, there were many among the active participants in 
scientific advances during the sixteenth and seventeenth century who had not only the wits 
but the inclination to be actively engaged in one or another area of applied (“technological”) 
practice. Westfall (1993: pp.64-66) has found that among the 630 individuals listed in the 
Dictionary of Scientific Biography as having been born between the decade of Copernicus’ 
birth (the 1470s) and 1680, fully three quarters had engaged in some area of applied 
technology, including medicine. Among the 363 scientists not involved in any way in the 
medical or pharmacological arts, two-thirds had some technological accomplishment.
34 A 
mathematician of Johann Kepler's intellect, for example, could make himself useful if the 
circumstances so demanded.  When he succeeded to Tycho Brahe's place in Prague in the 
service of the Emperor Rudolph II, one of Kepler's duties was the casting of horoscopes; and 
when he was in Linz, Austria, in 1612--a year in which the wine harvest was exceptionally 
big--he undertook to make improvements on the then crude methods used for estimating the 
volumes of wine-casks.
35  All this may be labelled the utilitarian motive.  
 
 
33 See with special reference to patronage of mathematicians e.g., Feingold (1984: Ch. VI); Westfall 
(1985), Biagioli (1989, 1990); Rose (1977). 
34 Thus the surprisingly high showing among those who were “technologically involved” does not 
simply reflect the presence of many medical practitioners in the original sample. Westfall (1993:pp. 65-66) 
removing from the list all 238 of the individuals who were engaged in “medicine” (having earned medical 
degrees, pursuing medically related studies in anatomy, physiology, and surgery, or practising medicine for a 
livelihood). For good measure, another 29 practising pharmacologists can be removed, which reduces the 
number of those remaining to 363. Only 118, or one-third of those, were without any recorded technological 
involvements.  
35 See Boyer (1985: 354-58).  What puzzled Kepler was how the wine merchants were able to gauge the 
volumes of their casks, since the latter were of such variegated sizes and shapes. Kepler collected the results of 
his volumetric meditations--which led him to use the method of infinitesimals to find the volumes of various 
solids of revolution, including ones not even considered by Archimedes--in a book that appeared in 1615 under 
the title:  Stereometrica doliorum ("Volume-measurement of Barrels").  19 
 
 
                                                          
  But, at least at the end of the fifteenth century, any very direct "utilitarian" value to the 
elites of having in their service such intellects as those of the new breed of natural 
philosophers appears still to have been rather subsidiary to the status-enhancing patronage of 
individuals who were recognized winners of reputational tournaments.  Kings and princes, 
and the occupants of positions of power more generally, have also been consistent in 
displaying a desire to surround themselves with creative talents whose achievements would 
enhance not only their self-esteem, but their public image, their reputation, those aspects of 
grandeur and ostentatious display which served to reinforce claims to status.  Poets, artists, 
musicians, chroniclers, architects, instrument-makers and natural philosophers have often 
found employment in aristocratic courts, both because their skills might serve the pleasures of 
the court, and because their presence their "made a statement" in the competition among 
nobles for prestige.  These dyadic relationships offering material and political support in 
exchange for service often were precarious, too much subject to aristocratic whims and 
pleasures or to the abrupt terminations that would ensue on the demise of a patron.   
Nonetheless, they existed in this era as part of a well-articulated system characterized by 




The motivations for entering into a patron's role which reduce to symbolic acts of self-
aggrandizement, will here be called ornamental.  Motives of the ornamental kind for 
patronage of “savants” and “virtuosi,” however, should be understood to have been not less 
instrumental in character than were the utilitarian considerations previously mentioned.  The 
public display of "magnificence,” in which art and power had become allied, was a stock item 
in the repertoire of Renaissance state-craft.
37  Prodigal expenditure on achieving splendour 
was a princely virtue, a matter of central importance for both the Renaissance and Baroque 
court. This idea initially was articulated by the Florentine humanists who looked back to St. 
Thomas’s praise of magnificence as a virtue, and through that source ultimately to the 
Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle: “…great expenditure is becoming to those who have 
suitable means to start with…, and to people of high birth and reputation, an so on; for all 
these things bring with them greatness and prestige.”
38  But it soon took on other, more 
distinctly political colorations. 
 
36 See Biagioli (1990, 1993) for documentation of the assertion that Italian patronage relationships in 
the era of Galileo were elaborately structured, and far from idiosyncratic and "chaotic.” 
37 See Strong’s (1984) study of the alliance of “art” and “power” in public festivals marking politico-
military “triumphs,” and their evolution into theatrical “spectacles” at court over the period 1450-1650. 
Particularly intriguing in the present context is the employment of Renaissance artisan-engineers to create 
dramatic effects in these spectacles. Strong (pp. 36-40) comments on the engagement of Brunelleshci and 
Leonardo in such activities in Florence as “indicating how a vigorous medieval tradition that made use of 
engineering to achieve scenic and mechanical effects in the liturgy and in mystery plays began to be expanded 
and developed under the impact of the study of the texts of classical antiquity” – specifically the writings of 
Vitruvius on the use of machinery in festivals “to please the eye of the people,” and, considerably more 
informatively, the newly recovered mechanics of the School associated with Hero of Alexandria. On 
Renaissance engineers engineering, see Gille (1966).  
    
38 Quoted by Strong (1984: p.22), who adds that in the cases of Catherine de-Medici and Charles I, the 
importance of demonstrating “regal magnificence” through the production of court spectacle was such that “their 
greatest creations came during periods when the crown was not only heavily in debt but almost bankrupt.” They 
would have done better to follow the policy advocated in Chapter 16 of The Prince, which recommends 
avoiding excessive “liberality” even at the risk of acquiring a reputation for meanness. This is quite in keeping 
with the general tenor of Machiavelli’s counsel, that the ruler should be ready to act against the virtues that give 20 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
Mary Hollingsworth (1998:13-14) underscores this point with forceful clarity in 
regard to Renaissance patrons of architecture:
39
 
"For them, art was not a statement of their aesthetic sensibilities; it was the 
prime vehicle for the display of their achievements, their status, political 
ambitions or commercial prowess, their religious beliefs and their civic pride. 
The magnificent palaces and their lavish decoration commissioned by 
governments, guilds and individuals were designed to demonstrate the wealth 
and power of their owners. Architecture, above all, was visible, permanent and 
expensive. They understood its value as propaganda. Pope Nicholas V [1397-
1455] insisted that magnificent buildings were essential to convince ordinary 
people of the supreme power of the Church. In 1496 the Venetian diarist, 
Domenico Malipiero, reported that his government had begun to build a costly 
clock tower at a time of economic instability to demonstrate that the state was 
not bankrupt." 
 
But, over the course of the sixteenth century, the less durable furnishings of the court 
and even the ephemeral court spectacles and festivals aligned with the celebration of 
“magnificence” and “liberality” became instruments of ideological persuasion, projecting 
images of the harmony and legitimacy of a hierarchical social order based on political power; 
the display of magnificence was thus transmuted from an obligation of greatness into a means 
of reinforcing claims to prestige and authority in a politically and economically insecure 
world.
40
   
From the patrons’ point of view, therefore, most of the ornamental services that clients 
of the court might provide had "positional" value.
41 Although having an accomplished artist or 
 
men a good reputation in order to “preserve the state.”  
39 See also Hollingsworth (1996: esp. Ch. 9) on the role of art and architecture as “state propaganda” in 
sixteenth-century Venice, aimed at impressing visiting foreign dignitaries with might of the Republic and 
reinforcing “the myth of harmony and stability at home.”  
40 Goldthwaite (1993: esp. pp. 48-49), in examining the economic and social conditions in Italy that 
underlay the growth in the demand for art during the “High Renaissance,” notes that the degree of mobility 
within the elite ranks was far greater there than elsewhere in Europe; “[p]rincely patronage, so much more 
variable and better financed in Italy than elsewhere in Europe, was largely conditioned by the inherent instability 
of the state system arising from what Burckhart called the illegitimacy of power….The sixteenth century saw 
much fluctuation in the fortunes of the aristocracy and a continual injection of new blood.” Great expenditure on 
public building in Italy was not the exclusive prerogative of the lay and ecceliastical nobility in Italy, for, as 
Goldthwaite (p. 188) points out: “Oligarchs as well as princes viewed the city as the natural setting for the 
physical expression of their authority….Urban renewal was one way to celebrate the consolidation of power by 
the local oligarch, even if under the auspices of an outside government….The establishment of the Venetian 
state in the later fifteenth century was the occasion for celebration by local elites; and the ruling class in 
Vicenza, Brescia, Bergamo, and other towns found an appropriate expression of the new arrangements in public 
building, often in imitation of Venetian models.” 
 
41  The term "positional goods" has come to be used in referring to goods that are desired not for their 
intrinsic utility (satisfactions derived from their consumption), but because to possess more of these than other 
members of the society confers status satisfactions.  Unique goods, the limiting case of commodities in inelastic 
supply -- such as a famous painting, or the lot on the housing estate that commands the most splendid view, or 
the highest salary in the organization -- exemplify commodities that are said to hold (in addition to other desired 21 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and adept astronomer-astrologer in one's court was altogether a good thing, far better if they 
were persons of greater accomplishments and renown than the clients to be found at the 
courts of rivals. Of course, this was true as well of some among the utilitarian services.  
Possessing sophisticated military equipment and fortifications was good for security and 
warfare, but it was even better if one's preparations for armed conflict were more 
sophisticated than those of one's rivals. Competition among patrons gave added strength to in 
particular to the ornamental motives for supporting such clients. The pressures that Europe's 
ruling families felt to attach to their service artists, savants and others persons of distinction – 
clients, whose creative achievements and capabilities would enable them to render special 
unique services, were augmented by the instability of the political order and the proximity of 
numerous rival rulers and their courts. 
 
  If inventions and discoveries that met utilitarian needs were to be really useful they 
would in many cases have to be kept secret, at least not advertised indiscriminately.  This 
obviously applied in the case of some military devices, battle formations, and geographical 
knowledge concerning valuable trade routes.
42  By way of contrast, it is in the nature of the 
ornamental motive that it must be fulfilled by disclosure of marvellous discoveries and 
creations, indeed, that the client's achievement be widely publicized.  It was very much in the 
interest of a patron for the reputations of those he patronized to be enhanced in this way, for 
their fame augmented his own.  Galileo understood this well, as was evident from the adroit 
way in which he exploited his ability to prepare superior telescopes for the Grand Duke of 
Tuscany, Cosimo II de’ Medici: he urged his patron to present these to other crowned heads 
in Europe, whereby they too might observe the new-found moons of Jupiter that Galileo in 
the Sidereus Nuncius (March 1610) had proclaimed to be “the Medicean stars.”
43
 
  A patron thus might display either of two quite different dispositions towards 
inventions and discoveries made by the creative talents in his domain or Court: maintaining 
reticence, if not insisting on outright secrecy in some instances, but actively promoting public 
disclosure in others.  This dual disposition is understandable in the light of patrons' dual 
motivations for supporting the production and acquisition of new information about the 
material world.  Two distinct and ultimately conflicting attitudes towards knowledge--
identified above as the respective hallmarks of "Science" and of "Technology"-- were 
therefore reflected jointly in the dispositions and behaviors of aristocratic patrons in the late 
Renaissance. 
 
attributes) a positional value.   
42 Strikingly, among the non-medical set of distinguished contributors to the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century science studied by Westfall (1993: pp. 65-66), the two-thirds who also had practical technological 
involvement were virtually engaged in the fields where mathematics figured importantly: 41 percent in 
engineering (divided about evenly between military and hydraulic engineering), 19 percent in “navigation” and 
37 percent in “cartography.” 
 
43 See Drake (1957, 1978), Westfall (1985), and Biagioli (1990, 1993: Ch.1) for extensive discussion of 
the significance of Galileo’s telescope in the context of the patronage system.  Biagioli’s (2000) subsequent  
revisionist argument, regarding Galileo’s withholding of information about the telescope’s construction from 
other astronomers who were potential scientific competitors,  lends added strength to the interpretation provided 
here: the peculiarity of the telescope (as was later true also in the case of the microscope) lay in its self-
demonstrating nature for patrons. Consequently, the need for peer-validation of Galileo’s expertise, and the 
disclosure of this knowledge about the instrument’s construction, was corresponding attenuated.   22 
 
 
                                                          
 
  3.2 Mathematics and the heightening of informational asymmetry problems 
 
  Like all prospective employers of specialized ‘experts’, these patrons faced a 
recurring problem: how were they to select from among the contending applicants for 
clientage?  Men seeking patronage had naturally to display their skills, their 
accomplishments.  This in principle could be done either publicly, with a view first to earning 
renown, and thereby obtaining employment.  Or it could be done privately, within the 
restricted circle of the patron and those who served him.  Yet, the public revelation of 
novelties and the restricted modes of disclosure on the part of inventors and discoverers 
seeking patronage both were responsive to incentives to advertise the would-be clients’ 
talents. If a patron were always capable of evaluating the achievements of those seeking 
patronage and clients already in his service, matters would be relatively simple.  Performance 
would be the guide for screening, hiring, rejecting, firing and retaining inventors and 
discoverers.  Were the patron musically inclined and educated, for example, it is likely that he 
would have more fully formed ideas as to the special abilities he was seeking to patronize in 
choosing a court composer or musical tutor.  Biographies of composers, artists, philosophers 
and the patrons are replete with examples where men of greater creative talent sought, in 
various ways, to come to terms with their patrons' too well articulated tastes and fancies.  
 
  By the end of the sixteenth century the circumstances surrounding the patronage of 
savants were no longer so simple. The problem of asymmetric information is inherent in the 
principal-agent relationship between a patron and a client who possesses (or claims to 
possess) some special expertise. But the problems this could pose had grown obtrusively 
more serious in all the fields of intellectual and artistic endeavour that were touched by the 
evolution of Renaissance mathematics. With the rise of algebra, the geometry of conic 
sections, and trigonometry, the new mathematics had fused classical with Arabic elements 
and been transformed into what for most patrons was a dauntingly esoteric area of expertise. 
The problems and methods with which the mathematical disciplines of sixteenth-century 
Europe were concerned were, indeed, far more esoteric and intellectually demanding than the 
ubiquitously useful humanistic pursuit that had gathered a growing number of influential 
proponents in the course of the fifteenth century.
44  
 
  These developments, of course, had not come all of a sudden.  They were heralded by 
the widening practical application of mathematics during the Renaissance--to bookkeeping, 
mechanics, optics, surveying, cartography, and even art.
45  Indeed, an important feature that 
 
44 Though these developments are presented here as constituting a substantial discontinuity, both in 
epistemological terms and in their implications for the workings of elite patronage of learning in the 
Renaissance, it is appropriate to notice the existence of medieval precursors who had expressed appreciation for 
role of the mathematics sciences in “physics” (as well as for “experimentalism”). Leff (1968: Ch. 5), points out 
the intellectual indebtedness of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century to the mathematical physics 
tradition deriving from Robert Grosseteste [1168-1253], which was established at Oxford and the University of 
Paris during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Roger Bacon [ c.1220-c.1292], who had studied at both 
places and lectured on Aristotle at Paris in his youth, much admired Grosseteste’s mastery of the mathematical 
sciences to which subject (and optics) he devoted his best writings (see Lindberg 1992, pp. 222-229). The 
following translation of a Baconian dictum, clearly reiterating a view asserted by Aristotle, is the epigraph for 
Boyer’s (1985: p.272) chapter on European mathematics in the Middle Ages:  “Neglect of mathematics works 
injury to all knowledge, since he who is ignorant of it cannot know the other sciences or the things of this 
world.”  
     
45 For introductory surveys of mathematics and mathematical publishing during the Renaissance (particularly, 23 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
differentiated the art of the Italian and German Renaissance from medieval art was precisely 
the novel relationship that the former had developed with mathematics during the fifteenth 
century, through the formalized use of perspective for the plane representation of objects in 
three-dimensional space.  This close connection, forged in the treatises on perspective by 
Leon Battista Alberti (Della pictura, written in 1453, was printed in 1511) and by Piero della 
Francesca (c. 1478), was no less evident in the work of Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519).  His 
Tratto della pittura opened with the admonition: "Let no one who is not a mathematician read 
my works."
46 Long anticipating the insistence of Galileo and his school that any 
comprehension of nature would have to be expressed in mathematical terms, in the third 
decade of the sixteenth century, Oronce Fine', the first professor of mathematics at the new 
College royal in Paris, set out the following motto on the frontispiece of his Protomathesis 
(1532): 
 
"Since thoughtful Nature has created by number and measurement, and then 
enclosed each thing in its own weight; you will not be able to understand the 




  These expressions of the necessity of possessing mathematical knowledge were 
continuing a rhethorical tradition in Renaissance learning that had been established at least 
since the mid-fifteenth century. Perhaps the most notable among those who had presented a 
broad, humanist case for mathematical learning was Johannes Mhller of Konigsberg [1432-
1476], the great Renaissance mathematician who styled himself Regiomontanus.
48  In the 
course of the invited lectures in astronomy he delivered in Padua during April 1464, 
Regiomontanus issued the following rhetorical challenge to his listeners:
49
 
"To whom, by immortal God, are these worthy studies, not only useful, but even in part 
essential?  For in the first place I pass over all mechanics and artisans, to whom geometry 
would give much direction if they had learned its precepts, whether they attempted to 
 
1450-1575) see Sarton (1955: Ch. 151-165); Boyer (1985: Ch. XV); and Feingold (1984), on the changing place 
of mathematics in the curriculum of the English universities in this period.    
     
46 Quoted by Boyer [1985], p. 326.  For further details on the mathematical aspects of the works of della 
Francesca, see Field (1993). 
     
47 Quoted by Keller (1985:p. 354), who points out that the Renaissance advocates of mathematics would also 
have been likely to look for numerological or astrological types of mathematical explanations for the world 
around them, whereas men like  Galileo (and Mersenne, for that matter) found in mathematics the most certain 
and permanent form of earthly knowledge.  
  
48 On the work and influence of Regiomontanus, see Swedlow (1993), who points out the interpretation 
of the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century as the successful fusion of the "classical" mathematical 
sciences with the Baconian "experimental" sciences overlooks the more gradual Renaissance transformation of 
mathematics into something resembling its modern form. This was a development in which Regiomontanus, in 
whose work science was allied closely with humanism, played a signal role. Swerdlow (1993: 148-151) 
paraphrases, summarizes and comments upon a portion of the April 1464 astronomy lectures  in, "An Oration by 
Johannes Regiomontanus Delivered in Padua in a Reading of al-Farghani,” which contained the marvelous 
passage quoted in the text (below).   
     
 





                                                          
construct buildings, or conduct water, or transport heavy objects....Then I pass over the 
bankers, who greatly increase their wealth by skill in computation.  I pass over the throng 
of armor bearers and soldiers, to whom geometrical contrivances are useful for hurling 
missiles and aiming siege engines....What finally shall I recall of the makers of musical 
instruments, to whom I have so frequently pointed out their error in dividing measuring 
devices? 
  "I pass over all the mechanics in order that the utility of mathematics to liberal studies 
may be fully shown.  Do you not know how frequently the Peripatetic Philosopher makes 
use of mathematical examples?  Nearly all of his writings are fragrant with mathematical 
learning, as though no one who has neglected the quadrivium of the liberal arts may be 
considered capable of understanding Aristotle....Does it, I pray, seem to you of little 
significance that he places our [mathematical] sciences in the first degree of certainty, 
considering that only one who has expertly understood them is knowledgeable? 
   "Also alluding to this, a certain Plotinus, an Academic, said, 'Would that all things 
were mathematical!' so seized by disgust was he with the other arts, which can surely be 
considered nothing but a mass of discordant opinions....Do not the followers of Aristotle 
today rather impudently tear at most of his writings with some risk, uncertain whether he 
intended to speak of names or of things?  How many branches, differing both from each 
other and from their trunk, has this sect sent forth?....Consequently, the more leaders 
philosophy has, the less it is understood in our time....not even Aristotle himself, if he 
came back to life, would be thought adequately to understand his disciples and followers.  
This no one unless mad has dared to assert of our sciences, since neither age nor the 
customs of men can take anything away from them.  The theorems of Euclid have the 
same certainty today as a thousand years ago.  The discoveries of Archimedes will instil 
no less admiration in men to come after a thousand centuries than the delight instilled by 
our own reading." 
 
A century after Regiomontanus, the practical “fruit” of mathematics had become a 
commonplace of prescriptions for humanist educational reform – as evidenced by the fact that 
the Jesuit order, striving to maintain a leading position in contemporary education, had fully 
embraced this trend.
50  In the Society’s rationale for its instructional curriculum in Germany, 
published in 1586, the case for mathematics was argued in what by then were well-rehearsed 
terms:  
 
“[Mathematics] teaches poets about the rising and setting of the stars; teaches 
historians the situation and distances of various places; teaches logicians 
[?analytici] examples of solid demonstrations; teaches politicians truly admirable 
methods for conducting affairs at home and during war; teaches physicists the 
manners and diversity of celestial movements, of light, of colors, of diaphanous 
bodies, of sounds; teaches metaphysicians the number of the spheres and 
intelligences; teaches theologians the principal parts of the divine creation; 
teaches jurists and canonists calendrical computation, not to speak of the services 
rendered by the work of mathematicians to the state, to medicine, to navigation, 
 
50 As Dear (1988: esp. Chs. 3-4) has shown , traditional scholastic learning, including  Jesuit teachings 
on the importance of mathematics, strongly influenced the thought of Marin Mersenne [1588-1648], the 
Mimimite friar who carried on a prodigious correspondence with Hobbes, Pascal, Descartes, Fermat and others 
during the 1630’s and 1640’s.   Mersenne took the mathematical disciplines as the foundation for the existence 
of certainty in knowledge and therefore as the basis of his refutation of Pyrrhonian skepticism.    25 
 
 
                                                          
and to agriculture. An effort must therefore be made so that mathematics will 
flourish in our colleges as well as the other disciplines.”
51
 
Similar arguments were made (perhaps not coincidentally) in the same year by the German 
Jesuit mathematician Christoph Clavius [1537-1612], who prescribed the identification of 
mathematical passages in Aristotle as pedagogical exercises, and laid particular stress on the 
mathematical disciplines’ importance for an understanding of “natural philosophy:”  
 
“Physics cannot be understood correctly with [the mathematical disciplines], 
especially what pertains to that part concerning the number and motion of the 
celestial orbs, of the multitude of intelligences, of the effects of the stars, 
which depend on the various conjunctions, oppositions and other distances 
between them, of the divisions of continuous quantities to infinity, of the tides, 
of the winds, of comets, the rainbow, haloes, and other meteorological 
matters….I omit an infinity of examples in Aristotle, Plato and their most 
illustrious interpreters which can in no way be understood without some 
knowledge of the mathematical sciences."
52  
 
By the late sixteenth century the continuity between the rhetoric of the humanist 
educational tradition the increasingly advertised importance that a newer and more 
sophisticated brand of mathematics held for students of natural philosophy was posing an 
unprecedented problem for would-be patrons of the virtuosi.
 53  Statements about the natural 
world had become so mathematical and technical in their form that neither the typical head of 
a noble house, nor his advisors, were prepared by virtue of their own talents and training 
properly to judge the quality of work associated with the new learning.
54 This obviously 
would be a concern where the motivation for patronage of natural philosophers and other 
savants was primarily of the ornamental sort. 
 
But, that was not the limit of the problem. Whether or not advanced mathematical 
skills really were required to satisfactorily perform most of the utilitarian services, or to 
provide that part of humanist instruction to the children of elite families, was beside the point. 
 
51 Translation from 1586 Ratio studiorum et institutiones scholasticae Societatis Iesu per Germanium 
olin vigentes collectae (Berlin, 1887-1894:2: pp.141-142 ), presented by Dear (1988: pp. 44-45).  
52 English translation from Christoph Clavius, “Modus quo disciplinae mathematicae in scholis 
Societatis possent promoveri,” In Monumenta paedogagical Societatis Iesu quae primam Rationem Studiorum 
1586 praeccessere (Madrid 1901: p. 472), in Dear (1988: p. 45).  On Clavius, who taught mathematics at the 
Collegio Romano, produced a long string of textbooks  used by the Jesuit colleges  throughout Europe – 
covering arithmetic, algebra, geometry, gnomonics, the astrolabe the computus (abacus), trigonometric and 
astronomical tables, and advised Pope Gregory XIII on the reform of the calendar in 1582, see e.g., Sarton 
(1955:p.138); Boyer (1985: pp. 334, 353).   
  
53 On the program and rhetoric developed on behalf of a mathematical education by a number of 
western European writers during the 1570s and 1580s - including Nicolo Tartaglia, and G. F. Peverone in 
Venice, Pierre de la RamJe (Ramus) in Paris, and John Dee in London, see Keller (1985).  
54  See Feingold's (1984: 192) conclusion that by the seventeenth century the vast majority of England's 
upper classes "pursued the mathematical sciences as one more accomplishment in a many-faceted, but by no 
means profound, education."  On the patronage and social position of mathematicians in Venice and Florence at 
the end of the sixteenth century, see Rose (1977) and Biagioli (1989), respectively. 26 
 
 
                                                          
How was an inexpert principal to know how much his prospective agent needed to know? For 
those would be patrons who could afford the expenditure, was it not best to try to employ the 
most competent? If the exacerbated nature of these informational asymmetries thus posed 
problems for patrons, they would perforce be problematic for the intellectually talented who 
hoped to enjoy such material support, social status and political protection as noble patronage 
could afford.  
 
  3.3 Coping with informational asymmetries in the patronage system   
  
How could a patron be reasonably assured that he had not by mistake taken into his 
service an incompetent, or worse, a charlatan, whose exposure as such would only reflect 
badly upon his own repute among rival patrons of the arts and sciences?  To put the problem 
in modern words: how were court mathematicians and natural philosophers who claimed to 
draw heavily upon their command of mathematical skills to be screened for their ability?  Or, 
how were men of "science" and mathematics to obtain credentials for employment when 
aristocratic employers were becoming increasingly incapable of directly evaluating the 
quality of their work? 
 
Challenges and Public Contests, Reputational Competition and Priority Disputes: 
 
As this central problem of the patronage system was rooted in the growing asymmetry 
of information that the new mathematical learning associated with the Scientific Revolution 
was creating between client-agents and patron-principles, it might well be expected that 
modes of coping with it would first begin to arise in that arena. It seems particularly pertinent 
in this context to notice that from the mid-sixteenth century onwards -- which usually is taken 
as the start of the era of modern mathematics -- there was a perceptible quickening of 
communication among Europe’s adepts in algebra. Moreover, this development featured 
increasingly open discussions, recorded in correspondence that conveyed claims of new 
results and information about new techniques, as well as new mathematical conundrums and 
solutions of long-standing puzzles.   
 
 Public boasts and the issuing of challenges created occasions for the arranging of 
public contests among the Renaissance mathematicians.
55 One such event was the famous 
competition in the 1530’s involving the algebraic solution of cubic equations, in which 
Niccolo Tartaglia (c. 1499-1557) convincingly demonstrated his command of a technique far 
more powerful than the method that used by Antonio Maria Fior. The latter, a mathematician 
now judged to have been of only “mediocre” ability, nonetheless had been making something 
of a name for himself -- on the basis of being able to find the real roots of a simple form of 
the cubic.
56 According to Tartaglia’s account, it was the news of the existence of an algebraic 
 
 
55 See Boyer (1985: pp. 311-12, 341) for examples of “contests” involving famous mathematicians of 
the sixteenth century.  Quite evidently, this was a continuation, albeit on an increasing scale of earlier practices 
involving open competitions among proponents of rival arithmetic methods: see, e.g., Bell (1937); Boyer (1985: 
pp. 309) for a depiction of a contest between an “algorist” and an “abacist” in the Rechenbhcher  (1529) of 
Adam Reisse, the celebrated German algebrist.  
56 This was the so-called “cosa and cube problem”: x
3 + ax = b, where a, b > 0. (The cosa, being Italian 
for “thing,” referred to (x) the unknown quantity.  The method Fior employed was not one of his own devising; 
it been discovered by his mathematics professor at Bologna, Scipione del Ferro (c.1465-1526), who not did 
make it public but on his deathbed passed the secret to Fior. The details of the ensuing Tartaglia-Fior contest are 
drawn from the account by given by Boyer (1985: pp. 311-12), and O’Connor and Robertson (2004) – adhering 27 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
solution of the cubic that stirred his interest in taking up the problem, and in 1535 his 
declaration of that intent led to the arrangement of a contest between them. Tartaglia scored a 
complete victory, having been able to devise a means of answering all 30 of the questions that 
were set for him by his opponent, who was stumped by the 30 questions that Tartaglia posed 
(which involved the more general cubic form). This public triumph soon brought the winner 
an invitation to visit the famous physician and mathematician Girilamo Cardano [Jerome 
Cardan, 1501-1571], who held out prospects of a patronage arrangement for him in exchange 
for information about Tartaglia’s method.
57   
  
  The tradition of open challenges involving ever-more sophisticated mathematical 
problems flowered with the progress of the discipline as the century drew to a close. In 1593 
a Belgian mathematician, Adrian van Roomen [1561-1615] challenged anyone to produce a 
solution to an equation of the forty-fifth degree, and the ambassador form the Low Countries 
to the court of Henry IV, learning of this, taunted his hosts that France had no mathematician 
capable of responding to the challenge from his countryman. National honor was thus at 
stake, as well as a chance for a French mathematician to display his talents in a very public, 
high status arena. The opportunity was seized by the gifted Francois VietJ, who famously saw 
a trigonometric transformation that would enable him to find the positive roots – which he 




  Occasions of this kind became increasingly frequent in the following period, as 
virtuosi issued public challenges for others to find answers to problems which they had 
already solved — a practice in which Galileo and others had indulged, but which was brought 
to a high art by Pierre de Fermat.
59 Although Fermat was ostensibly unmotivated by simple 
aspirations for employment as a mathematician, being securely settled in Toulouse as a 
lawyer and councillor to the Parlement there, he was hardly indifferent to the fame which he 
was quickly to acquire -- as one of the leading mathematicians of his time, once he had been 
brought into contact with Marin Mersenne.. In the course of an ensuing extensive 
correspondence with the Minimite friar in Paris, Fermat posed a succession of challenges 
(and, as others soon came to understand, reminders of his talents) to the attention of the circle 
of mathematicians and physicists with whom Mersenne maintained an active correspondence.  
 
 
to the latter’s chronology.  
57 See Boyer (1985: 310-312). Cardan apparently intimated that he would arrange for Tartaglia to meet 
a prospective patron, and, by swearing an oath to keep the secret, induced the latter to reveal his technique for 
solving the cubic x
3 + ax
2 + bx = c, which he subsequently published  in his Ars Magna in 1545, acknowledging 
he had learned of it from Tartaglia.    
58 Boyer (1985: pp. 334-342) relates this story, noting that although VietJ made deep, generalizing 
contributions in the fields of algebra and trigonometry  which moved the mathematics of his day closer to the 
modern conception of the discipline as a form of reasoning rather that a collection of specific solution-tricks,  he 
did all that in his spare time. He first trained as a lawyer, and had a career as a parliamentarian and in the 
diplomatic service. So his acceptance of the public challenge should probably be ascribed to the honor of the 
occasion (and ego-gratification?), rather than prospects of material benefits. 
59 On the period in which Descartes and Fermat dominated the mathematical scene in France, see Boyer 
(1985: Ch. 17). O’Connor and Robertson (2004b)  28 
 
 
                                                          
  In a setting in which public reputations for intellectual accomplishments began to 
matter as a signal of individual’s capabilities, disagreements about who had done what, and 
who had done if first, were more likely to become a serious matter—and not only for the 
individuals immediately involved. Referees would need to take a position on such matters.  
Interestingly enough, Robert Merton (1938/[1970]: p. 169) remarked that the latter part of the 
sixteenth century appears to have seen the first outcropping of numerous public disputes 
among mathematicians and scientists over claims to “priority” in discoveries or inventions – 
some among which became sufficiently vehement, protracted and marked by personal rancor 
to have attracted much wider and enduring notice.  
 
  Many squabbles over priority arose from the conjunction of essentially independent 
developments of instruments, or of observational findings. Their clustering in this period 
could be attributable to the well-known phenomenon of “multiplicity” that has been a 
documented pattern of scientific advance, with “simultaneous discoveries” being made on 
particular topics and in “hot” field where new, fruitful ideas and strategies of inquiry are “in 
the air.”
60  Promising ideas get into the air through social communications, however, so that 
improvements in the speed and range of messages passing by word of mouth from travelling 
scholars, or by the greater volume of correspondence that had begun to flow through 
improved postal systems in this particular era, also may have been a significant contributory 
factor. The continuing increase in the density and ramification the interconnected “circles of 
correspondence” among scientist and mathematicians in the seventeenth century reinforced 
these developments. Moreover, by contributing to the growing momentum of the “internal” 
intellectual development of the mathematical disciplines, those developments in social 




  Disputes are more likely to become acrimonious, however, when personal dignity 
and public honor become engaged, which frequently was the case where one of the parties 
was aggrieved the perception that there had been a breach of trust on the part of a confidant, 
or disconcerted by the unexpected and pre-emptive announcement of “their” discovery or 
invention – claimed by another participant (however distantly situated) in the growing 
networks among corresponding scientists. Emblematic of the developments in this era were 
the “sordid controversy” that erupted in the 1540s between Nicolo Tartaglia and Gilamo 
Cardano (Cardan) and their respective supporters, and the bitter dispute over priority in 
formulation of the geoheliocentric system starting in 1584-85 between Tycho Brahe and the 
mathematician Nicolai Rymers Ursus.
62  These were notable precursors of the well-known 
 
60 The sociology of controversies over scientific priority is treated famously by Merton (1973: Ch. 14 in 
his classic 1957 paper [“Priority in scientific discovery”]; also pp. 334, 340). See Lamb and Easton (1984: Ch. 
11) on the statistical evidence and causes of “scientific multiples,” specifically in connection with the genesis of 
priority disputes.  Dasgupta and David (1987, 1994)] discuss the economic significance of priority and priority 
disputes in modern scientific research settings.  
 
61 See Boyer (1985: p. 367) connects the reorientation toward the internal development of mathematics 
with the formation and expansion of an interconnected community: “not since the days of Plato had there been 
such mathematical intercommunication as during the seventeenth century….From the seventeenth century, 
therefore, mathematics developed more in terms of inner logic than through economic, social, or technological 
forces, as is apparent particularly in the work of Descartes…” 
62 See Boyer (1985: 310-312), who applies the adjective “sordid.” Cardan did add insult to injury, in 
justifying having broken his pledge (o never reveal Tartaglia’s method for solving the cubic), on the ground that 29 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
seventeenth-century wrangles over priority involving distinguished controversialists, in which 
Galileo disputed with Christopher Schneider over who had made the first observations of 
sunspots; and Newton engaged Robert Hooke in battles for priority of discoveries in the fields 
of optics and celestial mechanics, before entering into his protracted and aggravating fight 
with Leibniz over the invention of the differential calculus.
63  
   
  An opportunity for ‘direct confirmation’-- the telescope and Galileo:  
   
 For patrons seeking to judge the qualifications of potential scientific clients, there 
was an alternative to seeking reassurance in the “collegiate reputation” he had established 
within the community of client-scientists who already had managed to gain distinction for 
their expertise. That, of course, would require forming their own judgement, by inference 
from personal verification of an achievement that could be verified without a command of the 
very same sort of esoteric knowledge that the would-be client claimed to possess.  The 
opportunities to do this were quite limited, but where they did present themselves, an 
applicant for patronage obviously would find it quicker to build a reputation by responding to 
them directly.  The effectiveness of the tactic in such exceptional circumstances is evident 
from a well-known incident in the career of Galileo. 
 
  When Galileo burst upon the European intellectual scene in 1609-10 he was already 
forty-five years old and scarcely known outside two narrow circles in Venice-Padua and 
Florence.
64  One should notice that it was not mathematics that catapulted him to instant fame 
from the comparative obscurity of a professorship at the University of Padua (where his 
tenure was about to expire) and the proprietorship of a small instrument-making business in 
the town.  Nor was it the great works for which he is now acclaimed, the Dialogue 
Concerning the Two Chief World Systems (1632/1967) and the Discourse on the Two New 
Sciences (1638/1974), as those were products of his later years.  Rather, Galileo was able to 
make a name for himself by first constructing a telescope remarkably better than those that 
previously had been built in northern Europe, which, on being presented to the Venetian 
Senate in August 1609, quickly won him tenure and a remarkable salary increase. 
 
 
Tartaglia had not been the originator but had received a hint of the general solution from another source. This 
allegation remained unsubstantiated, although, as Boyer notes, Tartaglia himself was not above publishing the 
results of other mathematicians without crediting them. See O’Neil (1991) for an interesting discussion in of the 
ensuing extended controversy between Tartaglia and Cardan, although the interpretation offered there in terms 
of “intellectual property ownership” is somewhat strained. On Tyco and Ursus, see Thoren (1990: pp.255-256, 
260-261, 390-96).  
63 See Merton (1973: pp. 286-288); Biagioli (1993: pp. 57-58, 63, 68, 70) specifically on Schneider and 
Galileo; Westfall (1980: Chs. 7, 14) on controversies involving Hooke, and the priority dispute with Leibniz, 
respectively. 
64 Drake (1980: Ch.2) provides a wonderfully concise and nuanced account of Galileo's early years.  It 
should be said that Galileo’s move to a mathematics professorship at the University of Padua in 1592, on the 
strength of his teaching reputation at Pisa and with the support of early patrons, had brought him into greater 
academic prominence.  Padua had passed under Venetian sovereignty in the late fifteenth century and its 
university had benefited from the uniquely enlightened tolerance of Venetian rule; the University of Padua was 
renowned throughout Europe for its school of medicine, as a center of (Aristotelian) natural philosophy, and for 
a faculty of mathematics that was second only to that of Bologna. See Biagioli (1993: 30-32) on patronage in 
Galileo's early career. 30 
 
 
                                                          
Proceeding to build a still more powerful instrument for his own use, Galileo soon 
thereafter published the pamphlet Sidereus Nuncius ("The Starry Messenger,” March 1610) 
announcing that the new stars he had been able to observe near Jupiter were in fact satellites 
circling that planet.
65  From the viewpoint of Galileo's career, the true beauty of this heavenly 
discovery lay in the fact that to confirm it required little or no expertise, just reasonably clear 
vision, access to the new telescope, and directions as to where in the night sky one should 
look. The historian of science, Richard Westfall (1985) called attention to the adroitness with 
which Galileo exploited this aspect of his achievement, using it to the fullest advantage within 
the context of the patronage system.  For some time beforehand he had unsuccessfully been 
seeking to attract the attention of a princely patron who might free him from the burdens of 
teaching, and give him the leisure and security to pursue research and writing.  The ducal 
family of his native Florence was the most obvious target. So now he named his new-found 
moons of Jupiter "the Medicean stars,” quickly composed the Sidereus Nuncius to proclaim 
their existence publicly, and dedicated the work to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Cosimo II de' 
Medici.  As Westfall noted, Galileo took the opportunity to send the Grand Duke "an 
exquisite telescope,” so that he might see for himself the sort of heavenly secrets that his 
would-be client had the power to reveal. 
 
  Moreover, when that gambit had paid off handsomely and he had been taken into the 
Grand Duke's service, Galileo persuaded his patron to let him prepare excellent telescopes to 
be presented (only at the Duke's orders) as gifts to the other rulers of Europe--so that they, 
too, could not doubt the existence of the new celestial bodies that bore his name.
66  Westfall 
(1985: 4) described this as "an inspired manoeuvre whereby Galileo enlisted the Grand Duke 
as his public relations agent."  Such self-promotional genius, and such readily transportable,  
auto-confirmatory devices, however, could not be deployed by most practitioners of the new 
science who were seeking public reputations that would command the attention and the 
patronage of princes.
67  Scientific reputations would, in more typical circumstances, have to 
be built first among professional peers who were equipped to evaluate one's claims, and even 
in the case of so seemingly transparent an instrument as the telescope, questions of the 
reliability of Galileo's announcements of the astronomical observations he had made with it, 
ultimately were referred to other "expert" astronomers for corroboration. 
 
65 See Drake (1957, 1978); Westfall (1985), and Biagioli (1990, 1993: Ch.1) for extensive discussion of 
the significance of Galileo’s telescope in the context of the patronage system.   
 
66  The Grand Duke favored Galileo with a gold chain, a medal, and in June 1610, an appointment as 
"Chief Mathematician of the University of Pisa and Philosopher to the Grand Duke, without obligation to teach 
and reside at the University or in the city of Pisa, and with a salary of one thousand Florentine scudi per annum." 
Boorstin (1983: 321). Biagioli (1993:104) notes that this was a remarkable stipend, comparable to that of the 
highest court official and at least three times that of any highly paid artist or engineer of the day.  Galileo's 
earlier ploy, in presenting the telescope to the Venetian Doge, also succeeded in getting the Senate to renew his 
professorship at Padua for life, at a salary that was almost doubled. Although he left Padua for the service of the 
Grand Duke, in Florence, the resentments stirred among his rivals for patronage there--like those he kindled 
upon arriving in Florence--would be a source of Galileo's later troubles, including those with the Jesuits, 
according to Westfall (1985). Drake (1980) advances the radically revisionist but very plausible thesis that 
Galileo was zealous to protect the Church from conflicts between its theological positions and the new science, 
and recognized his real opponents to be the university-based natural philosophers defending the purely 
"theoretical" Aristotelian system of science.  But for quite a different and enormously controversial reading of 
Galileo's Trial before the Inquisition, see Redondi (1987).    
67 The microscope-makers of the day, however, enjoyed some parallel advantages. 31 
 
 
                                                          
 
  The pattern of distribution of Galileo's telescopes along with copies of the Siderius 
Nuncius, nevertheless illustrates in a particularly striking way the intimate connections that 
existed between the patronage system and the formation of networks of communication 
among the new scientists.  Indeed, as Westfall (1989: 35) notes, in this information 
dissemination process it was the Medici ambassadors who provided what modern 
communications engineers would recognize as the system's "physical transport layer.”  For 
example, the astronomer Johannes Zugmann had read the copy of the Siderius Nuncius which 
had been sent to his patron the elector of Cologne, and Ilario Altobelli, an astrologer and 
astronomer and friend of Galileo's in Rome, received the copy sent to Cardinal Conti.   Kepler 
obtained the Siderius from Giuliano de' Medici (the Medici ambassador to the court of 
Emperor Rudolph II), who summoned him to the Medici palace in Prague where he was read 
a letter from Galileo inviting him to respond to make a response -- an invitation that was 
reinforced both by the ambassador's "own exhortation" and a request from his patron and 
employer Rudolph, that he express his opinion in the matter.  In the spring of 1610, Galileo 
used the supportive response in Kepler's Conversations with the Sidereal Messenger as 
testimony to the international recognition of his discoveries, in order to counter doubts that 
were being circulated about the reliability of his telescopic observations 
68  
 
  Evidently, the role of the patron's emissaries in these transactions involved 
something beyond mere "message transport.”  Mario Biagioli (1993: 58) has argued that 
"Galileo did not use pre-existing diplomatic and aristocratic communications networks simply 
because they were practically convenient....The use of diplomatic connections -- of diplomats 
who partook of the status of the prince they were presenting -- gave Galileo credibility."  
Nevertheless, exactly what sort of "credibility" this represented remains a rather complex and 
contentious question.  Biagioli (1990, 1993: 3) takes the position that social and political 
status translated directly into scientific credibility.  He presents the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century European court, with its etiquette and appended rituals of aristocratic 
patronage, as contributing crucially to the "cognitive legitimation of the new science by 
providing venues for the social legitimation of its practitioners, and this, in turn, boosted the 
epistemological status of their discipline." 
 
  In a bold elaboration upon this interpretation, Biagioli (1993: 59) declares: 
 
"If it is a bit naive to consider scientific credibility as related only to peers' recognition, 
even in modern science, such a view is seriously misleading when used to interpret the 
construction of scientific credit and legitimation in early modern science.  I think it would 
be useful to suspend for a moment the 'natural' belief that Galileo, Kepler, and Clavius 
earned their titles (e.g., in the case of Kepler, `Mathematician to the Emperor’) because of 
their credibility and the quality of their scientific work.  As a thought experiment, we may 




68 Kepler did respond, in his Conversation with the Sidereal Messenger, which he dedicated to 'the 
ambassador of Prince Medici Grande Duke of Tuscany, himself a Medici by birth," who had "sought this service 
from me." See Biagioli's (1993: 56-58, 95-97) account for this, and the other instances cited in this paragraph. 32 
 
 
                                                          
  Although there surely is some merit in essaying such a reading of the historical 
evidence, patently, the preceding statement goes rather overboard.
69  Advancement to 
prominent positions within the hierarchy of patronage may well have transmitted a signal that 
enhanced the professional scientific standing of the individuals involved, yet it is difficult to 
suppose that such a signal would long retain much scientific credibility-value, for either peers 
or patrons, were it known that advancement to such positions was purely a matter of 
aristocratic caprice or ecclesiastical politics. By the same token, it would seem that to dismiss 
“public reputation,” and particularly the judgement of peers as being without importance as a 
basis for individual scientific credibility in this historical context errs by neglecting to 
consider the needs of highly placed patrons. Surely it was a matter of concern to protect their 
own status from the embarrassments that would ensue from endorsing incompetents and 
outright charlatans. It would be reckless to disregard the significant risks inherent in a client’s 
exposure to challenges brought by other clients, and would-be clients – challenges that   
possibly might be directed ultimately against the patron, a process that is amply documented 
by Biagioli’s own researches. 
 
  Of course, it surely is right to have pointed out that the patronage system operating in 
the Renaissance took into account many things about a mathematician-philosopher besides 
the attestation of peers as to his "technical" proficiency.  There were family connections and 
alliances, political and theological factions, social graces, and much else besides, to consider 
when selecting a client who would be useful in advancing the prestige of a patron.  So, there 
must have been "trade-offs,” whereby more gifted scientists were passed over in favor of the 
less gifted but more diplomatic, or the socially better-connected. Such things are not unheard 
of in the modern era either, but we may suppose that personal attributes that today would be 
dismissed as "scientifically irrelevant" exercised far greater influence in the careers of 
Galileo, Kepler, and their contemporaries. 
 
  On balance, however, it seems most reasonable to maintain that the survivors of 
reputational trials in diverse fields of arcane knowledge acquired “credibility,” not because 
high-status patrons conferred it upon them through acts of appointment to serve at court, but 
because contemporaries would have understood that patrons could not have afforded simply 
to act upon their personal judgements in such esoteric matters. Rather, they had endorsed the 
outcome of an “external” screening process that` “testified” to their clients’ expertise. The 
more public the screening, and the wider the consensus of views that were manifestly 
independent of the patron, the more “trustworthy” the choice would be when judged in terms 
of the latter’s interests.
70   
 
69 As Noel Swedlow has remarked (in private communication, April 1994):"Think of all the nonentities 
that held similar court positions!" 
70 To pursue the modern parallel: it is correct to say that a scientist today gains credibility from the fact 
of receiving an appointment to an endowed professorship at a prestigious university (although that is not the sole 
route available);but, this is not because it is supposed that the Dean, President, or Chancellor of the university in 
question has judged the individual's competence, any more than it would be presumed that the appointing 
officials had given weight to the individual’s family connections and personal manner.  What counts is the 
presumption that the reputation of their institution and their own reputations as good institutional stewards are 
matters of concern to the administrators; that they therefore would have acted prudently, insisting that the 
candidates for professorships be vetted by some other agency, acknowledged by others to be competent -- 
indeed, on average, more competent than they themselves to make such evaluations.  Of course, the beauty of 
the things is that the implied admission of ignorance will be their surest claim for exoneration should the 
appointment turn out to have been a mistake -- "We took the advice of experts.”  33 
 
 
                                                          
  
4. Patronage, competition, and common agency: some economic implications  
 
Although for purposes of the foregoing exposition heavy use has been made of the 
story of Galileo and his involvement in the system of patron-relations in the Italian courts, the 
situation and experiences of many other notable scientific figures in courts throughout 
Western Europe should similarly be noticed as deserving of closer analytical examination. As 
has already been remarked, Johannes Kepler served in the court of Emperor Rudolph II in 
Prague, a position in which he succeeded Tycho Brahe.
71 Galileo’s illustrious student, 
Torriceli, succeeded him as court mathematician in Florence, and his friend Borelli, who did 
pioneering theoretical work on the possibilities of flight, lived in Rome as the protégé of the 
retired Queen of Sweden.
72 Leibniz served the electors of Hanover for forty years as a 
diplomat and advisor, and so on. Innumerable additional instances of court patronage 
involving both the greater and the lesser luminaries among the scientists of this era have been 
documented by social historians of science in the contributions in Moran (1991), including 
the court of Prince Henry of Wales (d.1612) at Richmond Palace, the Court of Rudolph II and 
the Habsburg circle in the mid-seventeenth century, and the Munich Court of Ferdinand 
Maria, the Elector of Bavaria (r. 1654-1679). But the mere multiplication of these examples 
does not in itself do much to advance our understanding of why the client-scientists of this era 
appear to have flourished under the patronage regime as their numbers swelled. That is the 
problem to which we must now turn.  
  The competition among patrons for mathematician-clients, as an aspect of the 
aristocratic rivalry for prestige and power in Renaissance Europe, proved beneficial to the 
"new philosophers" and induced entry into the emerging profession of "science.”  The central 
analytical issue in this proposition concerns the structure of "common agency" contracts. It 
has been suggested that we think of the relations between patrons and mathematician-clients 
in terms of principal-agent arrangements, characterized by the ability of the patron-principal 
to stipulate the terms on which favors, monetary stipends, valuable gifts, and social and 
political connections would be dispensed in return for "ornamental" or utilitarian services.  
Such patrons faced a problem more general than the one posed by the fact that they were not 
competent in most cases to evaluate the technical expertise of their mathematician-clients; the 
latter might acquire information in the course of a patronage relationship which could be used 
to advance the client at the possible expense of his patron's interests.  
 
  We should not suppose that written, legally binding contracts sealed the patron-client 
bond. On the other hand, the nature of the dyadic relationship was neither unstructured nor 
entirely idiosyncratic. That there were well-established "conventions" and "rituals" governing 
such exchanges has been shown by Biagioli's (1993) examination of the system of patronage 
in Galileo's time.  From that discussion what emerges clearly -- as one might well suppose -- 
is that the patron determined how casual or close a connection he wished to form with any 
 
71 Although born into a noble family, and possessing sufficient means earlier in his life to furnish his 
magnificent observatory on the island of Uraniborg with all the latest in astronomical instruments, on 1 May 
1598 went he received the Rudolph’s invitation to come to Prague, he was without a patron, living in exile from 
Denmark, and in need of ready money.  He delayed his journey for three months, it is presumed in the hope that 
the printing of his lunar theory would be completed with a suitable dedication to the Emperor, before presenting 
himself to his prospective patron in Prague. See Thoren (1990: Ch. 12).  
72 See Mokyr (1990: pp. 73, 84, 169 ) on  Leibniz, Torcelli and Borelli, respectively.  34 
 
 
particular client, from among the set of supplicants.  Indeed, it was within the discretion of 
the patron as to whether or not contacts through "brokers" or intermediary clients would be 
invited, or reciprocated. 
 
  Further, it is clear that except for the few great successes, like Galileo and Kepler, 
mathematician-scientists with a public reputation would accumulate a number of patrons.  
Our perception of the patronage system as involving exclusive dyadic relationships between a 
patron and his client, which would perhaps be replicated with more and more numerous 
clients as one moved up the ladder of wealth and social prestige, is based on the familiarity 
with the later stages in the careers of a few, eminently successful practitioners of the new 
science. To be able to rise to the position where a great prince was your patron -- as Rudolph 
II was the patron of Kepler, or Cosimo II was Galileo's -- was the grand ambition of those 
who entered this system from the lower ranks of the social order.  According to Biagioli 
(1990: 12-13), Galileo was quite conscious that one could not compound the social 
legitimation offered by the patronage received from many small patrons into the equivalent of 
that which a great single patron would afford, even if the material benefits might be 
comparable.  Writing early in 1609 to a Florentine courtier, Galileo made it plain that he 
regarded a career that involved serving many low status patrons for piecemeal compensation 
to be "cheapening,” a sort of prostitution ("servitu meretricia"): 
 
"Regarding the everyday duties, I shun only that type of prostitution consisting of having 
to expose my labor to the arbitrary prices set by every customer.  Instead, I will never 
look down on service a prince or a great lord or those who may depend on him, but, to the 
contrary, I will always desire such a position." (Translation by Biagioli 1990:13)  
       
  A patron who had to "share" a client with others would naturally try to structure the 
terms of the arrangement so as to have his interests served. Since the core of the system 
involved competition for prestige gained by association with the famous, services yielded by 
clients had a strong "positional goods" aspect; several patrons might gain prestige relative to 
others if the public reputation of their common client were to be enhanced, but they would 
also be vying with one another to capture some greater share of the glory. Since what the 
scientist-clients had to offer was "novelty,” at any point in time the welfare (‘satisfaction’) of 
several patrons could not be jointly advanced to the same degree.  In that sense the services 
provided by a client to his several patrons were "substitutes" rather than "complements": the 
same treatise could not be dedicated publicly to more than one patron, and it could risk the 
rupture of a valuable relationship to present the same ‘gift,’ whether that of a new 
astronomical discovery, or an exotic botanical or zoological specimen, in two courts.  
 
  4.1 Common agency games and the distribution of information rents 
 
  With multiple patrons to satisfy in order to sustain their ‘professional’ life-styles, 
and, a fortiori to further elevate their position, the clients would find it tempting to turn to 
others such as students, apprentices, and colleagues further down on the scientific career 
ladder, to help with the work. But that would be exactly what would concern the potential 
patrons.  Would it not be likely that if they offered a substantial incremental reward, in order 
to induce a more impressive dedicated offering from their client, the result would be that the 
resources would be used to subsidize the production of another ‘gift’ that could be proffered 
to a different patron?  Indeed, it would. Following Dixit’s (1995) intuitive exposition of 
common agency games, we may seen how the two-part incentive schemes provided by the 35 
 
 
                                                          
patron-principals in this situation would interact, and what that implies for the equilibrium of 
the (tacit) game between the principles. 
 
    Dixit’s simplified model supposes there are only two principals (patrons) -- call them 
F for Frederick, and R for Rudolph -- trying to influence a single agent (C, the client), who 
controls the performance of two scientific projects f and r , each of which is expected to yield 
a dedicated result.  Principal F is primarily interested in the outcome of f, while R is intrigued 
by the prospects of r.  While the outcomes will eventually be disclosed for all to see, the 
amount of effort that C devotes to the tasks is not observable by the principals. But inasmuch 
as the agent’s time or effort is limited, more spent on f will necessarily mean less being spent 
on r, and vice-versa.  Therefore, principal F will be disposed to hold out the offer of an 
incentive scheme that responds positively to greater elaboration, or faster completion of 
project f (‘f-output’), and negatively to r-output -- perhaps penalizing C’s prior publication of 




 Similarly,  R’s incentive scheme rewards the agent positively for greater r-output, and 
penalizes the production of more f-output. Now the problem is that if either principal were to 
offer a ‘high-powered’ incentive scheme, which proffered very large marginal rewards for 
their favored form of client-service (r or f, respectively) a response to it by the agent would 
result in the implicit transfer of some resources to the other principal.  If the agent hurries to 
complete project r in order to obtain the enlarge ‘reciprocation’ of his ‘gift’ by R, the penalty 
imposed by dissatisfied F would be tantamount to the levy of a tax upon the marginal payoff 
received from the satisfied principal. Some of R’s ‘gift’ to C is, in effect, passed back to F -- 
inasmuch as C’s participation in the scientific undertakings is predicated upon obtaining a 
minimum payoff.  If the two principals can recognize this, offering high-powered schemes 
will not seem desirable for either of them. But, each would find it attractive to offer some 
incentive to their client, because the tax the other would levy on C’s marginal rewards for 
pleasing them is less than one-for-one, and so allows for some inducement of effort on their 
behalf.  In the final outcome, as Dixit (1995) shows, the Nash equilibrium of the game of 
strategy between the principals is that the overall power of these incentive contracts is rather 
low.  Little wonder that a scientist operating within this patronage system would express a 
desire, as we have seen in the case of Galileo, to escape from the servicing of multiple patrons 
and be taken up in an exclusive relationship with the court of a great prince.
74  
 
73 Conveniently, in the model analyzed by Dixit (1995) there is a constant term as well as a variable 
conditional reward, so that the incentive schemes follow the two-part structure of the patronage contracts that we 
have seen to be characteristic of court patronage systems. Dixit (1995: 4) points out that the level of this ‘sure 
payment’ can be adjusted to make sure that the agent is willing to accept the contract, given that there is a 
measure of uncertainty surrounding the outcome of these scientific projects.  
74 Dixit (1995) demonstrates, in the context of the simplified model, that there are different levels of 
efficiency associated with the equilibrium of the game, according to the assumptions made about what can be 
observed, and who can cooperate with whom. The maximum efficiency for the system is attained in the ideal 
state where everything (input efforts and outputs) can be observed by all, and all principals bargain with the 
agent. But, acknowledging the informational asymmetry between the principals and the agent, a second-best 
optimum is achieved when all the principals cooperate explicitly, in which case they behave as one patron; not 
having to worry about free-riding by other principals, the preferred contract offers the agent high-powered 
incentives. One may suppose, however, that it was the freedom from the time occupied in interactions with 
numerous patrons, and the prospect of high marginal rewards for scientific accomplishments that made the 
prospect of having a single (wealthy) patron attractive to Galileo -- rather than a concern for the fact that the 
resulting second-best optimum would dominate the multiple patron Nash equilibrium in terms of its allocative 36 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
  The fact that very few scientists could achieve such an apotheosis in their profession 
during the seventeenth century, and so had to balance between the competing expectations of 
an array of patrons carried other implications, however, which worked to ameliorate their 
material situation.  It is important in this connection to emphasize the point that the prevailing 
circumstances of common agency, as has just been seen, created a relationship of substitutes 
at the margin, rather than complementaries among the differentiated services they performed 
for their multiple patrons. This situation arose from the dominance in this historical epoch of 
patrons' concerns with the "ornamental" rather than the "utilitarian" value of scientist-
philosophers, and among its direct consequences was that the structure of the incentives 
offered to clients, weakened as it was, still remained more favorable to the scientist-
philosophers than would have been the case were patrons willing content themselves with the 
benefits of knowledge ‘spill-overs’ from the inquiries supported by courts other than their 
own.  When, in a later era, the utilitarian applications of scientific knowledge became 
paramount, there would tend to be greater complementarity between the services that could 
be provided to different patrons by a common agent, and the possibilities of free-riding on 
work undertaken for other patrons tended to diminishing the bargaining power of individual 
researchers. 
 
  The preceding line of argument is consistent with the conclusions emerging from a 
recent formal analysis of the common agency problem by Lars Stole (1991).  Stole shows that 
(for the case in which the agent must choose either to accept multiple principals or none) 
when the agent-services are substitutes (complements) the contracts designed by principals 
produce less (more) inefficiency in the production of services than would result from having a 
sole principal. They also leave the agents with more (fewer) "information rents.”  A 
monopsony thus would tend to extract the "producer surpluses" from the agents, whereas 
competition on the buying side of the market allows them to retain more "rent" on their 
specialized knowledge.  On the other side of the ledger, however, a monopsony might avoid a 
market failure if what principals wanted was access to a public good, which all could enjoy if 
it was collectively provided, but which their (misguided) competition for more privately 
appropriable forms of benefits prevents from being produced by their common agent. 
 
  It should be remarked that in Europe, the politically-inspired reputational rivalries 
among noble patrons to secure more of the attentions of their frequently shared client(s) 
worked to allow the latter to retain more "rents" from the information each of the latter 
possessed, in comparison with the situation that would have obtained were there only a single 
possible patron on the scene.  This is a fairly obvious amplification of the conclusions from 
preceding analysis, albeit one that is often overlooked.  A strong central state would create a 
monopsony situation in the market for patronage, whereas in Renaissance Europe one had 
many contending courts. The latter was better for the scientists, who were less at the mercy of 
arbitrary political authority and economic power than would otherwise have been the case. 
 
  The Reformation acquires a new significance -- if that is conceivable -- when seen in 
this context: the emergence of Protestant princes in the North of Europe reduced the sphere 
within which the one universal source of authority, the Catholic Church, could exercise its 
political and social influence over lay patrons of science.  Although this did not suffice to 
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spare Galileo from trouble -- indeed, many of his troubles might be attributed to the Jesuit 
Order's perception that successful prosecution of the Counter-Reformation required vigorous 
suppression of all challenges to the Curia's authority in matters of theology -- it undoubtedly 
made it more difficult to maintain a European monopsony in the market for intellectual 
services. 
 
  It may be asked, further, whether the competition among patrons also was good for 
"science.”  There are two effects to be considered here: the effect on the development of the 
profession, and that upon the content of the knowledge being produced.  With regard to the 
former, it would appear that by leaving greater rents to the individual scientists, and creating 
super-star winners of reputational tournaments, the workings of the patronage system induced 
more people to enter the profession.  On the other hand, the fact that patrons sought 
"positional services" from their scientist-clients operated to focus the latter' attention less 
upon the production of knowledge that had a public goods dimension, and more upon putting 
their knowledge to use in forms that served the interests of particular patrons.  A centralized 
system of patronage, although likely to be worse from the viewpoint of its effects upon the 
scientists' autonomy and social status, might have been better able to focus attention on those 
lines of inquiry that would yield complementary benefits to those who supported science. 
 
 
5. Open science, ‘invisible colleges’ and the ‘new age of academies’ 
 
   The foregoing, necessarily compressed treatment of immensely complex matters has 
focused upon the economic aspects of patronage in the production of knowledge, and the 
latter’s influence upon the historical formation of key elements in the ethos and 
organizational structure of open science.  Those developments preceded and laid the 
foundations for the later seventeenth and eighteenth century institutionalization of the open 
pursuit of scientific knowledge under the auspices of State-sponsored academies.  In the 
period from the 1660s to 1793, some 70 officially recognized scientific organizations have 
been identified as having been founded specifically on the models provided by the Royal 
Society of London (founded privately in 1660 and receiving charters from Charles II in 1662 
and 1663), and the Académie royale des Sciences created established in 1666 by Louis XIV 
(on the initiative of Jean-Baptiste Colbert). 
  
  The activities of these two archetypal State foundations, and the ensuing formal 
institutional ‘reorganization of science’ in Europe that they inspired, have received much 
attention from more than one generation of historians of science.
75  Although justified by both 
the wider influence they exerted, and the depth of the archival material available for study, 
the emphasis placed upon the first pair of academies to be established under monarchical  
patronage in era of the emerging nation state has tended to deflect scholarly interests away 
from the generic features in the workings of the early learned societies and scientific 
academics -- the lesser and the greater, the many organized under private patronage as well as 
those grand objects of State support. 
 
 
75 See, e.g., Brown (1934 [1967]), Hirschfield (1957[1981]), Orenstein (1963), Hahn (1971), Hunter 
(1981).  38 
 
 
                                                          
  Another correlate of this particular historiographic fixation (doubtless equally 
unintended) was the excessive emphasis accorded to the aspect of discontinuity in the 
historical record of institutional development, identified in the institutional “reorganization of 
science” that marked the closing third of the seventeenth century. This contributed to further 
obscuring the broader significance of the conditions underlying the antecedent emergence of 
an “open science” ethos -- conditions that had not ceased to be relevant for the functioning of 
the new academies, but tended to be taken as given, and natural among the scientifically 
curious.  It also reinforced a long-standing disposition of the historical literature, especially 
that relating to the great French Academy of Sciences and its imitators on the continent, to 
present the organizational shifts associated with the new State patronage arrangements as 
having been induced more-or-less automatically -- as the rational institutional response to the 
dawning of the new scientific methodology. 
 
  But, the findings of more recent historical investigations, and the new perspectives 
that can be brought to these matters by economic analysis, point towards a rather different 
historical interpretation. Just as it has been argued in the foregoing pages that the intellectual 
reorientation represented by the Scientific Revolution cannot properly be held to have been a 
motor cause of the emergence of the “open” mode of searching for Nature’s Secrets, so there 
are good grounds to resist the interpretation of the ‘New Age of Academies’ as a radical 
institutional departure brought about by the economic imperatives of the new scientific 
practices. The following brief treatment of these large matters is intended to do no more than 
indicate the main analytical and empirical foundations for this reinterpretation.  
   
 
5.1 Understanding the early scientific societies – reputation, club goods, and  
the logic of ‘invisible colleges’ 
 
  The formation of networks of correspondence and the flowering of "invisible 
colleges" among mathematicians and the experimentalists in the new science was, in a sense, 
addressing the central problem of informational asymmetry in the late Renaissance patronage 
system.
76  Such networks, augmented by an expanding volume of printed pamphlets and 
treatises, provided an arena in which challenges could be issued, contests and competitions 
could be staged, and collegiate reputations could be both secured and widely broadcast.
77   
But, in the course of seventeenth century the formation and growth of these networks -- and 
with them, a system of continual peer-group evaluation based on public demonstrations of 
individual creative achievements -- was quite clearly reinforced and institutionalized through 
 
 
76 Price (1963: 83ff) adopted and conceptually extended the seventeenth century term "invisible 
college,” used by Robert Boyle in describing the small group of natural philosophers whose intellectual 
transactions with one another anticipated the formation of the Royal Society.  Invisible colleges, according to 
Price (1963:76), confer upon each scientist "status in the form of approbation from his peers, they confer 
prestige, and above all, they effectively solve a communication crisis by reducing a large group to a small select 
one of the maximum size that can be handled by interpersonal relationships."  See Merton (1986) on the 
relationships between the concepts of reference group, invisible college, and deviant behavior in science.  For a 
reformulation and defence of Merton’s emphasis on the ethos of cooperation and norms of disclosure, see David 
(1998, 2003c). 
 
77 Although the scope and intensity of activity in these networks of correspondence increased greatly 
during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, correspondence among scientists (including the 
chemical alchemists), like the previously noted exchanges, challenges and contests among Europe's 
mathematicians, were not an innovation of the seventeenth century  39 
 
 
                                                          
the creation of more and more formal scientific bodies that progressed from the “assemblies” 
and salon-like discussion groups gathering for scheduled meetings under the auspices of 
sponsor, to academies having elected members whose researches drew support from private 
patronage.
78 The extent to which the characteristic open style in which those organizations’ 
affairs came to be conducted was not merely symbiotic with the system of elite patronage, but 
was directly responsive to its requirements (as well as dependent upon its support), are 
questions that remains to be answered through renewed inquiries into the primary sources.  
Though those matters cannot be settled here, neither need they be.  It is enough for the 
purposes of the present argument to notice the ways in which participation in the early 
academies and scientific societies conveyed benefits upon their members.  
 
  The immediately pertinent question is: why should individuals seek to participate in 
associations where they would be expected freely to divulge the results of their investigations 
in to matters that might otherwise be a source of personal gain?  What incentive is offered for 
such cooperation -- outside of an institutionalized setting in which such conduct was made a 
formal obligation (publish or perish!) of career advancement?  Two answers come to mind.  
First, there was a certain status conferred by being accepted as a "correspondent" by already 
established "scientists-philosophers" persons of great repute.  This carried some "signalling 
value."  Second, there is the "exchange value" of information: division of intellectual labor 
confers advantages to those who need not work in isolation but can instead draw upon 
codified knowledge and tacit expertise of others to solve particular problems.  Access to such 
"networks" of assistance must be purchased by proffers of worthwhile "material" or 
accreditation.  These points may warrant being considered more fully, taking them in turn. 
 
  The Signal Value of Correspondent Status:  This is a generic property, not restricted 
to relationship between scientists.  A passage from Richard Westfall's account (1980: 541) 
suggests how the astronomer John Flamsteed regarded his cooperation with Newton's request 
for lunar observations.  What he wanted from Newton was acceptance as a "philosophic 
peer,” and he replied in the following way to Newton's offer to pay him for the trouble of 
copying some astronomical observations:  "All the return I can allow or ever expect from 
such persons with whom I corresponded is only to have the result of their Studies imparted as 
freely as I afford them the effect of my paines."  Flamsteed emphasized that admission to this 
reciprocal status involved approbation; he wrote to Newton that his "approbation is more to 
me than the cry of all the ignorant in ye World." 
 
  From this it is apparent that the would-be correspondent's motivation could be vanity 
or ego gratification from such acceptance into peer-ship, and/or a rational instrumental desire 
to be accorded status that would enhance one's prestige with third parties.  Here the 
mechanism at work is "passive patronage": if I am able claim acceptance as a correspondent 
by a recognized "great,” a star, it raises my prestige with others.  But, the signal can be 
discounted -- Flamsteed wanted to be thought a peer, whereas Newton viewed him (privately) 
as an inferior but useful collaborator.  Those at the top of the hierarchy of recognized status 
benefit by being able to accord some patronage to those below them, a derived patronage 
effect that is important in reputational work organizations.  This is a benefit of winning a 
 
78  (Lux (1989:  Ch. XXX traces the evolution during the years 1665-1666 of a provincial assembJe 
formed in the provincial French town of Caen into the AcadJmie des Physiques (physiology) du Caen under the 
patronage of a local figure of noble parentage who as a young man had made a reputation in the French world of 
belles lettres and had “connections” to people close to Louis XIV. This institution flourished briefly, and in 
1672 received royal patronage (as the first among provincial institutions to do so.)  40 
 
 
                                                          
tournament.  Nevertheless, more than vanity might be involved: Flamsteed truly was devoted 
to his astronomy and had labored long and hard, under difficult conditions and with little 
reward; quite naturally he wanted Newton's scientific help, as well as well assistance in 
furthering his career. 
 
  Network Membership: Unlike signalling value, network membership benefits can be 
thought to have a substantive basis for both researchers and their patron-employers, whether 
or not the final disposition of the knowledge that is acquired will be public disclosure or 
private exploitation in some directly productive activity.  The network members have 
solutions to problems at their disposal, which they are prepared to share.  It is a "patent-
pooling" arrangement without the patents--a loose coalition, in which some degree of non-
compliance with the norm of mutual help will occur, and so yield an equilibrium in which the 
"common pool" is degraded by the private reservation of certain information.  Nevertheless, 
access to help from "peers" remains a valuable asset for the individual. 
 
5.2 Enforcing the ethos: the disclosure norms and knowledge-sharing games 
 
  To restate the thrust of the foregoing considerations, it is possible that cooperative 
behavior within a limited sphere can emerge and be sustained without requiring the prior 
perfect socialization of researchers to conform, altruistically, to the norm of full disclosure 
and cooperation.  This is a rather straightforward instance in which insights from the theory 
of repeated games are applicable to explaining cooperative behavior among potentially 
rivalrous researchers.
79  To sharpen this point, one should start simply by considering two 
researchers working towards the same scientific goal which involves the solution of two sub-
problems, and suppose that each has solved one of the problems.  Once each gets the other 
solution, it will be a matter of writing up the result and sending it off to the corresponding 
secretary of a scientific society, or a journal for publication, the first to do so being awarded 
priority.  Now suppose, further, that the write-up time is determined by a random process, and 
that if both get both halves of the problem at the same moment, each will have the same (one 
half) probability of being the first of the pair to submit for publication.  Whether the winner 
will be awarded priority will depend, however, on whether or not some other researcher has 
obtained the full solution and sent it off already.  The question is: should the first researcher 
hope to get some part of the solution-payoff and follow the strategy (S) of sharing 
information with the other one, or instead adopt the strategy (W) of withholding? 
 
  If, without prior communication, they play the strategy pair (S,S) they can proceed 
immediately to the write-up stage; if they play (S,W) the second member of the pair will be 
able to proceed to the write-up, and the opposite will be true if they play (W,S).  Should they 
both withhold (W,W), they must both spend further time working on the other problem.  It is 
evident that if they are only going to be in this situation once, the rule of priority alone will 
induce each of them to withhold, and they will end up (collectively, if not individually) at a 
relative disadvantage vis-à-vis other researchers who are hurrying to publish.  If nobody else 
has the full solution yet, society also will have been forced to wait needlessly, because each 




79 The following parallels material developed in Dasgupta and David (1994).  41 
 
 
  This game has the structure of a classic two-person "Prisoners' Dilemma."  It is well 
known that an escape from the pessimal outcome is possible, if the game is played repeatedly, 
the future is not discounted too heavily, and the players expect the other member of the pair 
to remember and punish their failure to play cooperatively by sharing.  (Indeed, there is a so-
called "folk theorem" to that effect).
80  However, the value in the future of developing and 
maintaining a good reputation for sharing has to be large to discipline the self-interested 
researcher into adhering to the sharing mode of behavior in the current period.  If repetitive 
play comes to an end, or if the future is valued only slightly, cooperation will unravel from 
the distant terminal point in the game, right back to its inception. 
 
  Yet that is not the end of the matter. As there are other researchers in the picture, we 
should really be considering an n-person game, involving the solution of an m-part problem, 
where n > m.  Now the question of sharing information becomes one of sharing not only what 
you have learned yourself, and what you have been told by others. It is obviously 
advantageous to be in a group in which information will be pooled, because that will give the 
group members a better chance of quickly acquiring all m parts of the puzzle and being the 
first to send it in for publication.  On the other hand, individuals may behave 
opportunistically, by exchanging what they have learned from one group for information from 
people outside that group while withholding some knowledge from other within their group.  
In that way they might can expect to do still better in their current race for priority of 
publication.  Because others would see that such "double-dealing" will be a tempting strategy, 
however, cooperation will be unlikely to emerge unless "double-dealers" (who disclose what 
you tell them to third parties, but don't share their knowledge fully with you) can be detected 
and punished.  What is the form that retribution can take?  Most straightforward will be 
punishment by exclusion from the circle of co-operators in the future; and even more 
severely, not only from the circle that had been "betrayed" but from any other such circle.  
This may be accomplished readily enough by publicizing "deviance" from the sharing norms 
of the group, thereby spoiling the deviator's reputation and destroying his acceptability among 
other groups.
81
   
  What, then, is the likelihood that this form of effective deterrence will be perceived 
and therefore induce cooperative behavior among self-interested individuals?  If a group, i.e., 
"a research network" numbering g players (g < n) is large, identifying the source(s) of "leaks" 
of information and detecting instances of failure to share knowledge within it will be the more 
difficult.  It is worth remarking that the power of a large group to punish the typical deviator 
from its norms by ostracizing him tends to be enhanced by the higher probability that all 
those individuals with whom potential deviators will find it valuable to associate are situated 
within the group.  In other words, the expected loss entailed in being an "outcast" is greater 
when there is only a fringe of outsiders with whom one can still associate. 
 
                                                           
 
80 For a non-technical introduction to the literature on the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma and its broader 
implications, see Axelrod (1984). The "folk-theorem" of game theory holds that (if future payoffs are discounted 
by each player at a low rate) in the "super game" obtained by repeating a finite, two-person game indefinitely, 
any outcome that is individually rational can be implemented by a suitable choice among of the multiplicity of 
Nash equilibria that exist.  See Rubinstein (1979, 1980), and Fudenberg and Maskin (1984).  
 
81 See Greif (1989), and Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990) for analysis of repeated games of 
incomplete information that have this structure. 42 
 
 
                                                          
  But this consideration is offset by the greater difficulties the larger groups will 
encounter in detecting deviators.  Smaller groups have an advantage on the latter count, and 
that advantage also enables them to compensate for their disadvantage on the former count.  
The more compelling is the evidence that a particular individual had engaged in a "betrayal of 
trust," the more widely damaging will be the reputational consequences for the person thus 
charged.  Hence, unambiguous detection and attribution of deviations (from recognized 
norms regarding the disclosure and non-disclosure of information) augment the deterrent 
power of the threat of ostracism that can be wielded by any group that remains small in 
relation to the total population of individuals with whom an excluded group-member could 
form new associations. 
 
  The foregoing suggests that small cooperative "networks" of information sharing can 
be supported among researchers, because cooperative behavior furthers their self-interest in 
the race for priority, and denial of access to pools of shared information would place them at 
a severe disadvantage vis-à-vis competitors.
82  Does this imply that the normative content of 
Merton's communalistic norm of disclosure is really redundant, and plays no essential role in 
fostering conditions of cooperation among citizens of the Republic of Science?  Not at all!  
For it can be seen that networks of cooperative information sharing will be more likely to 
form spontaneously if the potential participants start by expecting others to cooperate, than if 
they expect "trust" to be betrayed; and cooperative patterns of behavior will be sustained 
longer if participants have reason to expect refusals to cooperate will be encountered only in 
retaliation for transgressions on their part.
83
 
  Furthermore, when the norms of behavior involved (i.e., the "custom" within the 
network in question) are common knowledge, and therefore part of the shared socialization 
among all the potential members of networks, detecting and reporting deviant behaviors that 
warrant punishments will be a more clear-cut matter. Potential deviants will think it more 
likely that the retribution of ostracism from a particular network will be attended by more 
widely damaging reputational consequences.  It is evident from this that even if the process of 
 
 
82 These "circles" or "networks" which informally facilitate the pooling of knowledge among distinct 
research entities on a restricted basis can exist as exceptions to both the dominant mode of "public knowledge" 
characterizing open science, or the dominant mode of "private knowledge" characterizing private sector R&D.  
Thus, von Hippel (1988) and others have described how firms in fact tacitly sanction covert exchanges of 
information (otherwise treated as proprietary and protected under the law of trade secrets) among their engineer-
employees.  Participants in these "information networks" who accepted money or remuneration other than in 
kind, most probably, would be dismissed and prosecuted for theft of trade secrets. 
83 A distinct, but closely complementary line of theoretical analysis has been developed that also 
supports the thrust of these conclusions. The modelling exercises in David (1998, 2002) show that social 
communication networks of scientists formed by the intersection of memberships in restricted “clubs” for 
private knowledge-exchanges are very likely to for spontaneously and be sustainable when their numbers remain 
small. But, in the absence of an articulated ethos that raises the expected propensities of individuals to regularly 
and frequently disclose pre-publication results and methods, and their evaluations of the claims of others to 
others in their local social networks (i.e., there “club”), the ensemble formed by the inter-connections among 
those entities is unlikely to be able to function well enough in reaching substantial “closure” on specific 
scientific questions to enable it to attract further membership. Consequently, under the conditions specified, the 
dynamic behavior of the “invisible college” (i.e., the ensemble) prevents it from expanding beyond the small 
(stable equilibrium) dimensions to attain the size and diversity of numbers that would transform it into rapid 
generator of contributions to reliable knowledge. To pursue the details further, however, would take the 
discussion too far afield from its present historical focus. 43 
 
 
                                                          
socialization among scientists were weak and quite imperfect, the common "culture of 
Science" makes it much more possible for the rule of priority to engage the self-interest of 
researchers in reinforcing adherence to the norms of disclosure, at least among those 
restricted circles of colleagues that Derek Price (1963) referred to as "invisible colleges.”
84
 
  The restriction of the circle of correspondence and conversation was not simply a 
matter of the constraints imposed on travel and written communications. It was a reflection of 
the economic incentives that impelled individuals to seek entry into these early scientific 
groups, especially when formal academies made public the existence and identities of their 
elected members. Those scientists who were admitted to academies obviously would be able 
to advertise the fact, and hope to collect the resulting “status” rents from their patrons and 
employers. Rents depend upon scarcity, however, and so admission plainly could not be open 
to all.  If it were, much of the private raison d'etre which the foregoing discussion has 
identified would soon dissipate, along with the reputation of the academy. Membership 
selections had to be on the basis of a scientist's ability to contribute to the creation of shared 
scarcity rents, rather than diluting them.  Such a basis could be provided, of course, by social 
connections, but not decisively; for, in these circles publicly disclosed scientific achievements 
were the foundation of sustained collective prestige. Consequently, there was motive aplenty 
for the individual members of these “parliaments of scientists” to collectively assume the role 
that could be proclaimed as that of guarding of “scientific excellence” in a world where 
neither the public nor the lay patrons of science could distinguish good scientists from inept 
or fraudulent ones. 
 
 5.3 Continuity, context and change in the institutional organization of science 
  
  Public demonstrations of talent were made more feasible by the institutionalization 
of scientific assemblies, the publication of transactions, the printing of papers and scientific 
treaties carrying the imprimatur of the Society or Academy, competitions and the awarding of 
prizes for the finest achievements.  Parliaments of scientists such as the Royal Society of 
London and the Parisian royal Academy of Sciences became, among other things, an 
important and increasingly predictable milieu within which professional scientific reputations 
could be secured.  Furthermore, as has already been argued, the most efficient means open to 
professional communities for conferring this status among researchers was through the 
assignment of credit for priority in discovery or invention. 
 
  In fact, professional societies served another and complementary purpose, which has 
been much commented upon in the literature on invisible colleges.  They provided an 
identified, institutionalized environment within which members could draw upon the help of 
peers to solve their scientific problems.  This is more than a mere open transfer of knowledge.  
Scientific exchanges, with their attendant evaluation of individual work, may be seen as a 
form of "patent-pooling" arrangement--without the patents – among the holders of 
complementary knowledge assets.
85  Scientific societies, like the informal networks of 
correspondents that they institutionalized, supported a loose coalition of researchers who 
 
84 Of course the enforcement mechanism described here is neutral with reference to the content of the 
norms. It could, by the same token, serve to enforce the preservation of “club secrets” when shared interests 
among the members were sufficiently strong to lead to the articulation of “rules” toward that purpose.  
85 On economic efficiency and patent pools, see, e.g., Shapiro (2001), Lerner and Tirole (2004). 44 
 
 
                                                          
engaged in repeated altruistic exchanges of their specialized knowledge.  Their formation thus 
was socially as well as privately beneficial in these effects upon the productivity of 
researchers. 
 
  To be sure, one would expect such sharing arrangements to be less than ideal: 
scientists in competition with one another would be expected to behave strategically in regard 
to how much information should be shared, even with fellow academicians, and which 
experts in what fields of scientific inquiry should be admitted into their company.  But among 
those within the society, the norm of cooperative disclosure (especially when accompanied by 
acknowledgements of priority) provided the basis for repeated, reciprocal information 
transactions that would on balance be conducive, both directly and indirectly (by assisting 
their research and publications) to further enhancing the external reputation of the members.  
There can be little doubt that it was far more efficient to institute these formal professional 
bodies than not. But, we should not therefore suppose that such considerations, any more than 
the internal imperatives of the new methods being employed in the new experimental and 
observational sciences had been sufficient, historically, to initiate the institutional movement 
that made State patronage of formal scientific academies a ubiquitous attribute of modern 
societies.   
 
Numerous scholarly studies grounded on the archives of the late seventeenth century 
academies have portrayed the onset of a distinctive phase in the institutionalization of modern 
science as being brought about by the growing scale and costs of the new modes of scientific 
inquiry.
86 The view that the advent of the expensive new laboratory science (not to mention 
the new observational astronomical observatories) proved too costly for private patrons, 
creating “a crisis” in the mid-1660s that was solved by the institutional innovation of State 
support under the regal patronage of Louis XIV, has come to be known among historians of 
science as the ‘Fontenelle thesis.’
87 Although this explanation itself is hardly of recent origin, 
having been first articulated early in the eighteenth century -- by Bernard Le Bovier de 
Fontenelle [1657-1757], a permanent secretary of the AcadJmie royale des Sciences and the 
author of the first history of that institution, one might suggest that this line of explanation 
had particularly strong resonance for historians of science writing in the 1960s and 1970s, 
when discussion of the phenomenon of “Big Science” and its funding requirements were very 
much in the air. 
88
  During the past two decades, however, a more persuasive case has been made for 
viewing the post-1660s phase in the evolution of the institutions of modern science as the 
continuation of a much broader cultural movement that had been taking place in Europe 
outside the medieval universities. One significant aspect of those developments was 
 
86 This is a theme that has been elaborated in regard to the history of the AcadJmie royale des Sciences 
and its continental sequelae, the founding of the Royal Society being presented as an exception. See, e.g., Hall 
(1956:pp. 196-197) and Hall (1983: 218-220).  See Lux (1989: pp. 4-7 for a historiographic introduction.   
87 See Lux 1989: pp. 4-7. For de Fontenelle’s scientific career the historical memoirs published in the 
1720s and 1730s, see Stroup (1993: esp., pp.19-23, 202); Sturdy (1995:pp. 239-241). 
88 On the growth of large-scale research (“big science”), see the essays edited by Galison and Hevly 
(1992), starting with Hevly’s insightful “Afterword” (pp. 355-363). For U.S. science policy and funding for 
highly capital-intensive “big science” in the post World War II decades, and the reorientation of opinion that 
occurred in the 1980s, see Smith (1990: pp. 11, 14-15, 156-157).     45 
 
 
manifested in the appearance around the end of the sixteenth century of numerous privately 
patronized scientific societies and ‘academies.’ 
 
  Indeed, seventeenth century science proper has been found to have played only a 
very minor part of that wider intellectual reorganization. Of the 2500 learned societies that are 
estimated by James McClellan (1985) to have been created in Europe between 1500 and 
1800, at least 700 were formed during the sixteenth century alone.  While some of these 
organizations were scientific in purpose, those were not in the pre-1550 vanguard; the 
overwhelming majority of them were formed in response to interests far broader than 
anything resembling the organized pursuit of science. The historian of France’s scientific 
academies David Lux (1991:pp.189,196)  has stressed the absence of close coupling between 
the nature of cognitive pursuits and their supporting organizational form, and reminds us that 
young intellectual wines can mature well old institutional casks:    
 
“the traditional points of departure for discussing organizational change in science -- della 
Porta’s Accademia Secretorum Naturae [founded in Naples, 1589] or Cesi’s Accademia 
dei Lincei [founded in Rome, 1604] -- offer nothing to suggest the intellectual novelties 
of sixteenth-century science produced real organizational change....Rather than producing 
organizational change, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century science followed other 
intellectual activity into new organizational forms. Indeed, in strictly organizational terms 
there is no obvious justification for attempting to isolate science from other forms of 
intellectual activity before the end of the seventeenth century.  Nor is there any obvious 
justification for portraying science as honing the cutting edge of organizational 
change....Despite the literature’s claims about novel science creating needs for new 
organizational forms, the institutional history of science across the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries actually speaks to a record in which scientific practice changed 
only after moving into new organizational forms.”   
 
  Thus, it is quite unwarranted to find an explanation for the developing practice of 
open science simply in the early opportunistic adoption of the humanist “academy” of the late 
Renaissance as an organizational mode for pursuing investigations of the natural world. But, 
equally misleading is the casual supposition that the motivations of individual participants in 
the new scientific disciplines for embracing open science and the new methods of inquiry it 
deployed were a sufficient force to impel the ensuing re-organization of their scientific 
activities under the auspices of State-sponsored institutions. 
 
  As in the treatment of the emergence of cooperation among the mathematicians and 
scientists of the late sixteenth century, so in examining the subsequent institutionalization of 
modern science, historical explanations should be contextually grounded upon an analysis of 
the incentives that shaped the behaviors of the actors involved. In the case of the founding of 
the AcadJmie royale des Sciences, a very significant actor was Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Louis 
XIV’s minister of finance and the navy. Moreover, the context of the initiative he took 
creating the this institution makes it inescapable to ignore that the decisive consideration were 
those emanated from the political logic of the absolutist State, and neither the structures of  
social interaction among researchers nor the material requirements of sustaining advances on  
the frontiers of observational and experimental sciences.  
 
  The obvious point of departure here is an appreciation that the foundation of the 
AcadJmie royale des Science was connected with a train of events set in motion by Louis 46 
 
 
                                                          
XIV announcing (upon the death of Cardinal Mazarin) in 1661 that he would serve 
henceforth as his own first minister. That had signaled the monarch’s intention to rule in his 
own right, tearing up the extensive networks of political patronage that previously had formed 
around great ministers of state like Richelieu and Mazarin, and particularly those grand 
nobles who only recently had mounted (unsuccessful) a direct military challenge to the 
monarchy. It followed from this that that le Roi Soleil, the unique star around whom the 
politics of French society was to revolve, should take the role of uncontested and universal 




To further underscore this point, and the continuity of the previous argument 
regarding the significance of ornamental motives for noble patronage, one may note that three 
years before the announcement of Louis XIV’s approval of the Académie royale des 
Sciences, Colbert had initiated the founding of the  Académie royale des Inscriptions et 
Médailles on February 3, 1663.
90  That was but a modest precursor of his grand scheme for 
the reform of learning in the realm, which contemplated the establishment of a universal 
academy under royal patronage incorporating four sections: philosophy, literature, history and 
mathematics. This plan, however, soon met with determined opposition from existing 
“corporations” in Paris – particularly the University, the Parlement and the guilds, so that 
only the part providing for the Académie des Sciences would survive to receive the King’s 
patronage.
91  It is relevant, too, that in giving shape to this new body, Colbert and his advisers 
envisaged the academicians as being occupied with the more theoretical and intellectually 
respectable range of scientific matters. The model appropriate for a royal foundation, even in 
that field, would seem to have been something closer to the culturally prestigious Académie 
FranHais. This is especially striking, for Colbert himself was hardly disinterested in the 
promotion of industry and industrial invention, and the idea of utilitarian benefits 
(“improvements in the conveniences of life”) flowing from research had been a frequent 
subject of discussion in French scientific circles such as the private Academy Montmor at 
least since the 1650’s. Indeed, at the very time that Colbert’s for a “grand academy” were 
being drawn up, an elaborate proposal for a Compagnie des sciences et des arts was 
circulating in Paris, envisaging improvements in navigation, flood control, better maps, 




89 For a recent account of the context of patronage in seventeenth-century France, and of the political 
circumstances surrounding Colbert’s initiative in founding the academy of sciences, see Sturdy (1995: Chs. 3-4), 
which supports the interpretation advanced by Lux (1989, 1990).    
90 Subsequently renamed the “Académie royale des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres” by royal decision on 
January 4, 1716). Initially it was nothing more than an informal work group co-opted from the members of the 
Académie Française under the monarch’s exclusive control, and tasked to provide Latin mottoes and inscriptions 
for the various monuments and medals that commemorated the noble deeds of the king, and the prestige of the 
French monarchy in general. See Leclant (2004). 
91 See George (1938:  pp. 379-386); Lux (1989: pp. 55-56) and Lux (1990) on the grand plan of 
Colbert. For the bearing of this on the Fontenelle thesis, see Lux (1989: pp.53 ff.). 
92 See Briggs (1991:pp. 40-42). This frankly utilitarian plan had been drawn up by Christian Huygens, a 





                                                          
  The Fontenelle thesis has been undermined further by David Lux’s (1989) 
demolition of one of the putative factual bases upon which it had been erected. Supposedly, a 
the suspension of the activities of a number of private scientific academies in Paris in the 
mid-1660’s had precipitated Colbert’s intervention to resolve the “crisis” by creating an 
academy that would receive State support.  Yet, there was no precipitating crisis, no evident 
exhaustion of the resources and consequent “failure” in the private patronage of science in 
France during 1665-66. The reported suspension of the work of several Parisian scientists, 
and the discontinuation of the regular meetings that had been hosted there by the polymath 
savant MelchisJdec ThJvenot [1620-1692], turn out not to have been causes, but instead were 
consequences -- first of the rumours about the progress of Colbert’s plans, then of the 
announcement confirming his success in persuading the King at least to found a royal 
academy for the sciences.
93  Under the finely graduated hierarchical political system of 
patronage in France, and following the declared intention of the Crown to displace the 
aristocracy from claims to the trappings of power (including the splendors of grand acts of 
patronage), once Louis XIV announced a royal academy would be formed, the 
discontinuation of the ThJvenot and other scientific academies under private patronage in 
Paris was only to be expected. 
 
The advent of State sponsorship of science in the late seventh-century, however, 
should not be depicted as bestowing unalloyed blessings upon the open science movement.  
Institutionalization of cooperation in formal organizations facilitated “regulation of conduct” 
on behalf of the academy-members’ common interests. One cannot not be surprised that such 
“a company of scientists,” finding themselves occupying the top-most echelon the top of the 
status hierarchy among such academies in France would set rules that restricted members’ 
freedom to communicate with “outsiders.” Whereas many among the less prestigious 
assemblJes and provincial academies had welcomed the establishment of regular exchanges 
of scientific information with other learned societies, the young AcadJmie royale des 
Sciences recorded in its minutes for 15 January 1667, that “the business of Academy should 
be kept secret and …communicated to outsiders only with the approval of the Company.”
94
 
Prominent among the early academicians’ motivating concerns was the forestalling of 
pre-emptive publication of their findings by foreigners. The academy’s first permanent 
secretary, although generally enthusiastic about exchanging discoveries with foreign 
 
  
93 The specific reference is to the meetings at the home of the polymath savant MelchisJdec ThJvenot 
[1620-1692], who in 1662 had organized (and continued to support) an academy in Paris in the two years 
following the disbanding of the Monmort Academy in 1664, a decade after its founding by Henri-Louis Habert 
de Monmort [d. 1679]. See Lux (1989:pp.55-56), on the details of timing on the continued meetings of the 
ThJvenot circle until the announcement of the new royal foundation. See Sturdy (1995: pp. 16-21), on other 
Parisian scientific assemblies, for ThJvenot was not the only private host for such gatherings in Paris during the 
years 1662-1665, although his ‘cabinet’ appears to have drawn the most illustrious company. It appears that 
deterioration in the personal finances, as well as in the health of Monmort added to his dissatisfactions with the 
ill-tempered disputes and factional rivalries among members of his academy, and so contributed to its closing. 
But this hardly lends substance to the picture of an institutional “crisis” driven by the cost of doing science.  
94 Stroup (1993: p. 205-206) notes that another concern revealed by commentaries in the archives was 
to protect the new academy from public ridicule that would be all the more biting for being informed about its 
internal proceedings. This was not a paranoid delusion in the age of MoliPre, and other play-writes and satirists 
for whom philosophers and physicians were stock figures of fun. The Royal Society also endured its share of 
mockery on the London stage in this era.   48 
 
 
                                                          
institutions, nonetheless justified the rule of secrecy, on the grounds that research was 
motivated “by the hope of gaining fame through priority.”
95 Changes in the regulations went 
farther this direction in 1688, by forbidding the members to publish without the permission of 
the Company, and stipulating that permissions were to be granted only after the Academy had 
examined the manuscript in question. De facto arrangements of the same nature were already 
in place at the French academicians’ counterpart institution in London: a member’s paper 
submitted to Henry Oldenberg, secretary to the Royal Society, would have to have been read 
at one of the Society’s meeting and met with approval before being forwarded by him for 
printing in the Philosophical Transactions.
96
 
    Membership of the new learned societies thus conferred substantial “club goods” 
benefits to researchers in ways other than the effects of signalling their talents and 
achievements as scientists. Those elected would gain access to shared knowledge under 
institutionally “regulated” terms of cooperation that reduced the risks of their new discoveries 
reaching the ears and eyes of (external) rivals for scientific priority and fame. That there was 
also a societal gain in exercising controls over the “quality” of scientific expertise signalled 
by membership in prestigious academies and societies seems beyond contention.
97  
 
  But the signals of quality emitted by the political process of electing new members 
were hardly perfect.  Undoubtedly, something of value to society was sacrificed in restricting 
their admission of members with an eye to the effects the candidates’ election would carry for 
the institution’s external repute --even in the judgements of those less well-informed about 
the scientific merits of the cases. The same must be said of the academy’s efforts to protect 
collective professional status by requiring general assent before members were permitted to 
have their discoveries and inventions printed for general circulation by the academy’s “house 
organ.” To be generous, one might say that what had been attained was a second-best (or 
maybe third-best) social outcome -- gaining for “the insiders” the efficiencies of exchanging 
scientific information as a club good, but losing the possibilities of greater positive 
externalities from more closely approaching a scientifically meritocratic, universally open 
regime of cooperation in the pursuit of knowledge.  
 
 
95 The phrasing is that of Stroup (1993: p. 206), who comments further: “This view was no less 
common in the seventeenth than in the twentieth century, despite protestations in both eras about cooperation.” 
Similar concerns were voiced some years earlier by a member of prestigious Academia del Cimento, the Italian 
mathematician and physiologist A. Borelli, who informed a patron of his preference “to go slowly in beginning 
this correspondence with those gentlemen of the Parisian [Monmort] academy, since in writing, on cannot do 
less than communicate something or other, and I fear that this may give those foreign minds an opportunity to 
rediscover [sic] the things; I am speaking of the causes, not the experiments.” Middleton (1971:p.300), as quoted 
by Stroup (1993:p. 207).  
96 Westfall (1980: p. 239) reproduces a relieved reply from Newton (10 February 1672) to Oldenberg’s 
letter that brought the news that the paper on colors – on which Newton  had labored for many years – had been 
read and “mett both with a singular attention and an uncommon applause,” and so could be published in the 
Philosophical Transactions. 
 
97 Restriction of entry into the medical and legal profession today has been rationalized in a similar 
manner in a classic essay by Arrow (1963). Medieval urban craft-guild regulations that effectively imposing 
quality standards, and the employment of hallmarks indicating the place of manufacture, are read likewise, as 
instances in which non-market restraints that were privately beneficial to insiders (by protecting their collective 
reputation of their specialized wares) also conveyed “quality control” benefits to consumers.  49 
 
 
                                                          
  With the growth of these societies in power and prestige, and with the coming of the 
Industrial Revolution--and in its wake, the multiplication and spread of organized centers of 
learning -- private aristocratic patronage, and the values it had imparted to the early 
institutionalized forms of State patronage, itself lost its strength.  The social institutions of 
science, and in particular the mechanisms for generating collegiate reputations persisted 
nonetheless. In large part this may be ascribed to the fact that they provided familiar models 
of arrangements whereby scientists could be screened for employment, and rewards could be 
allocated by agents and agencies acting on behalf of the new sources of patronage -- namely, 
industry and the state. 
 
  In a much later era, beginning in Germany mid-way during the nineteenth century, 
modern scientific research was introduced and became established regularly as a university-
based activity; a proliferating number of state-supported “academic” research institutes 
adapted for their use the organizational structures that had become familiar in government 
bureaucracies, along with the institutionalized practices of the scientific academy.
98  But the 
fundamental problems of reputation and agency upon which the economic analysis here has 
focused did not disappear; they re-surfaced in these new organizational settings. University 
patrons, both private and public, along with academic administrators and professors even 
today are confronted with informational asymmetries and agency problems. Collegiate 
reputational reward mechanisms operating in academic research communities today parallel 
in many respects those which have been seen to have characterized the system of European 
court patronage. In the sciences, especially, academic institutions and individuals also 
continue to seek ways to mediate the conflicts between the organizational logic of preserving 
modes and norms open inquiry, and the lure of capturing economic rents from their 
information about new discoveries and inventions. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions and Implications: The legacy of European feudalism, and a caution for 
modern science policy 
  
  But the moral to be drawn from the story related here is not simply that the more 
things change, the more they stay the same.  There is a particular historical irony, too, that 
seems well worthy of notice -- especially as it serves to underscore the tenacity of the past's 
hold on the incrementally evolving institutions that channel the course of economic change.
99   
The nub of it is simply this: An essentially pre-capitalist, European aristocratic disposition to 
award patronage for the purposes of enhancing rulers' political powers symbolically through 
competitive displays of "magnificence,” came to confer value upon those who pursued 
knowledge by following the "new science" in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  
Such men were deemed worth supporting at least as much because the public reputations 
 
98 
 Lenoir (1998), and LJcuyer (1998) provide economists with convenient, brief and insightful points 
of entry into both the history and the historiography of university-based research, and its connections with the 
perceived needs of industry and the state in mid-nineteenth-century Germany and twentieth-century America 
(pre-WW I), respectively. One may consult Vereek (1992) for an interesting economic interpretation of the less 
well known organizational reform of the German universities and research institutes along Prussian bureaucratic 
lines, which took place during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.  
 
99 On the theme of "path dependence" in the dynamics of economic systems, see, e.g. David (1988, 
1992, 1993b, 1997b). 50 
 
 
                                                          
gained by their achievements had an ornamental instrumentality for their patrons, as because 
their knowledge equipped them to devise technologies that would directly advance their 
patrons' economic or military interests. 
    
  The norms of cooperation and information disclosure within the community of 
scientists, and their institutionalization through the activities of formal scientific 
organizations, emerged (in part at least) as a response to the informational requirements of a 
system of patronage in which the competition among noble patrons for prestigious clients was 
crucial. Likewise the initiation of State patronage of scientific academies was propelled as 
much by the ornamental motives of absolute monarchies as by an appreciation of the new 
knowledge as a potential foundation of wealth and power. These echoed the former rivalries 
among the noble houses of the principalities that eventually were absorbed in the formation of 
Europe’s ascendant nation-states. They were part of the legacy of fragmented political 
authority left by western European feudalism, and in this regard they paralleled the conditions 
of "common agency" contracting in the late Renaissance relations among clients and patrons.  
 
  A comparison might therefore be drawn with the alternative circumstances of a 
monolithic political system, such as had prevailed elsewhere -- as in the Heavenly Empire of 
China, to cite a well-known case in point.  In place of any dominant single principal-patron in 
Western Europe, the multiplicity of contending noble courts tended to be more favorable to 
the agent-client members of the scientific community.  This was so both in terms of the 
"information rents" they were able to retain on their specialized knowledge, and their 
collective development of greater professional autonomy. 
 
  More than one economic historian’s speculations about the reasons for the material 
ascendancy of “the West” has drawn attention to the possible significance of the contrasting 
political environments of late medieval and early modern Europe, on the one hand, and that of 
contemporaneous China on the other.
100  The more familiar suggestion is that the degree of 
military security and centralized political control achieved under the Ming dynasty (1368-
1644) left the reception and retention of technological innovations hostage to the whims of a 
single court; and that it removed the pressures experienced by rival European rulers which led 




 In  The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1998: p. 38) David Landes presents a political 
variation on the same theme in the following characteristically robust formulation: 
“Ironically, then, Europe’s great good fortune lay in the Fall of Rome and the weakness and 
 
100 Joseph Needham (1969) posed the problem of why it was that though Chinese civilization had been 
“more efficient than ‘occidental’ civilization in applying human natural knowledge to practical human needs” 
between the first century B.C. and the fifteenth century A.D., Western Europe emerged as the technologically 
and industrially more dynamic society in the centuries that followed. But, Needham’s “reason why” had more to 
do with class and culture, than with political structure: for all its rationalism, China’s Mandarin bureaucracy 
could not make up for the lack of a “mercantile culture” that he saw as the core of Europe’s capitalism and 
expansionism.  
101  See, e.g., Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986), p. 137: “In the West, the individual centers of competing 
political power had a great deal to gain from introducing technological changes that promised commercial or 
industrial advantage, and hence greater government revenues, and much to lose from allowing others to 
introduce them first.”  51 
 
 
                                                          
division that ensued....in those middle years between ancient and modern, fragmentation was 
the strongest brake on wilful, oppressive behaviors.  Political rivalry and the right of exit 
made all the difference.” This resonates with the cogent observations made by Joel Mokyr in 
The Lever of Riches (1990:pp.178, 232) and The Gifts of Athena (2002: Ch. 6), pointing to the 
greater scope that centralized political control might allow for the suppression of 
technological innovations and new commercial practices.
102 On balance, the argument that 
fragmented control offered protections from resistance to technical innovations which might 
disturb incumbent seigniorial or bureaucratic elites, or otherwise disrupt established economic 
interests (of the guilds) and so jeopardize the sovereign’s fiscal base, seem quite rather more 
to the point than does the notion of rival princes encouraging technological innovations as 
part of their quest for new revenues.  
 
  That much having been said, the thesis that advanced here has a new and somewhat 
different thrust.  It is directed towards accounting for the paradoxical observation that the 
“scientific revolution” is a West European cultural product, despite the remarkable record of 
previous scientific inquiry and technological accomplishments in China, so richly 
documented by Joseph Needham (1954) and his collaborators.
103  Its burden is the idea that 
that the critical institutional side of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century -- 
which saw the pursuit of new knowledge carried on under the patronage of rival political 
authorities at numerous geographically dispersed and culturally diverse courts and academies, 
contributed not only to the flourishing of science, but to preserving the advances that had 
been made in the stock of reliable knowledge upon which further research could build.  It did 
so by providing the protection of statistical independence from the workings of the variety of 
systematic forces and exogenous disturbances to order that could interrupt the advancement 
of science in any one place and time – and often did so. By the same token, the practices of 
open science that developed within the European political and social context were conducive 
to maintaining the exchange of information through radiating networks of distributed and 
intellectually variegated actors, thereby stimulating and imparting momentum to cumulative 
process that uniquely characterized the advancement of science in that region of the world. 
 
In the course of a lively and comprehensive review of the state of the historical 
literature on China’s “failure” to sustain the technological supremacy that it had attained vis-
 
 
102 But, on the other side of the coin, one also must observe that in the European context, where 
entrenched craft-guild corporations (monopolies) exercised control over an extensive national territory – as was 
the case in eighteenth-century France, it was the absolute monarch’s ability also to grant privilPges  to 
independent inventors that served to counteract the chartered monopolies’ generally baleful influence upon 
industrial innovation (see Hilaire-PJrez 2000).  Obviously, the question is complex and cannot be readily 
resolved here. 
 
103 Joseph Needham believed that the emergence of the “scientific revolution” in Europe rather than 
China, like the rise of industry, was attributable to the “mercantile culture” found in the one place and not the 
other. China’s agrarian bureaucratic civilization, for all its interest in nature and technological precocity was 
lacking in those “bourgeois values” -- held so vital in Marxian analysis; and thus, being deprived of the 
opportunity to fuse scholars with craftsmen, was unable “to bring to the fusion-point the formerly separated 
disciplines of mathematics and nature-knowledge.”  (Needham, 1956:p.34, as quoted by Rosenberg and Birdzell, 
1986: p. 88).  This thesis has not gone uncriticised in the specialist literature (see, e.g., the points reviewed by 
Mokyr (1990: p.230-231), and Cohen (1994:pp.449-482). The argument I have constructed concerning Europe, 
however, is not meant to be construed as another attempt at a grand  “social class” explanation -- indicting the 
absence in China of European vassalage and “aristocratic values,” the culture of noble patronage, and the 
sublimation of feudal conflicts in rivalries for prestige among the princely courts.  52 
 
 
à-vis Europe at the end of the fourteenth century, Joel Moyer (1991:p. 223) suddenly recasts 
the question in the following way: “China’s lack of progress after 1400 is striking not only in 
the light of Europe’s success, but also compared with it own performance in the previous 
centuries…The European experience seems to suggest that nothing succeeds like 
success….Why does such a cumulative path-dependent model not work for 
China?”[Emphasis mine]. Although no really satisfying response was forthcoming from 
Mokyr’s ensuing pages, this rhetorical restatement was nonetheless insightfully provocative. 
The arguments tentatively advanced here, which have pointed to the functional value of 
distributed open science communities in providing a mode of insurance against exogenous 
interruptions to knowledge accumulation and erasures of the society’s collective memory file, 
can perhaps be taken as a belated suggestion of the direction in which historians of 
technology should continue searching for answers to that question.  
 
  The existence of the vital background conditions in Europe, of an extensive 
contiguous territory over which political power was decentralized to multiple, contending 
centers of authority, of course, was predicated upon the a distinctive aspect of the region’s 
political history. The logic of vassalage institutions in the medieval epoch had given rise to a 
political landscape of fragmented and contending principalities, each governed on the basis of 
personal authority.  Thus, baldly to state my summary thesis: the emergence of the 
characteristic institutions and organizational features of open science that have played so vital 
a role in generating the sustained material achievements of the era of modern economic 
growth,  well may be said to be western Feudalism's greatest gift to Capitalism. 
  
  There is a second, corollary proposition, to which the historical experience recounted 
here also lends weight. The methods of modern science themselves were not, and still are not 
sufficient to create either the unique cultural ethos associated with ‘the Republic of Science.’ 
Nor did they suffice to impel a transition to the public patronage of specialised scientific 
academies and kindred institutions whose rule and norms of behavior reflect and advance the 
collective, cooperative purposes of researchers engaged the open pursuit of knowledge.  The 
historical record thus provides scant assurance that the methodological power and technical 
sophistication of modern scientific research alone can safely be relied upon to permit only 
those modes of organization and governance that will sustain the functional attributes of 
institutional infrastructures that support the open science regime, however conducive that 
later may have been to the rapid growth of the stock of reliable knowledge.  Rather than 
emerging and surviving as robust epiphenomena of a new organum of intellectual inquiry, the 
institutions of open science are independent and in some measure fortuitous social and 
political constructs.  They are cultural legacies of European history that continue to 
profoundly influence the systemic efficacy of the scientific research process. 
 
  Features of the institutional infrastructure of public science, being thus in some 
significant degree exogenous to actual scientific practice, may be subjected to substantial re-
design and otherwise manipulated as potent instruments of science and technology policy.  In 
this sensitive area, however, wise policy-making for the future must pay especially careful 
heed to those organizational instruments’ own complex and contingent histories, and so 
respect the potential fragility of the institutional matrix within which modern science has 
evolved and flourished.    
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